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Contract as Commodified Promise
Erik Encarnacion*
Many scholars assume that lawmakers should design contract
law with the goal of facilitating commercial promises. But the question
of which promises count as commercial remains neglected. This Article
argues that this question matters more than one might initially expect.
Once we understand commerciality in terms of commodificationroughly, treating something as subject to market norms-surprising
recommendationsfor reform follow. First, if contract law should enforce
commodified promises, we should demote the considerationdoctrine to
a presumption of enforceability rather than a formal requirement.
Second, we should adopt a rule, contrary to current doctrine in most
jurisdictions in the United States, that intending to make a promise
legally binding renders it presumptively enforceable. Beyond these
reforms, understanding contracts as commodified promises also
provides a new lens through which to view recurring debates about
boilerplate, enforcing donative promises, remedies, and efficient
breaches. We can even understandthe 2008 financial crisis as caused in
part by over-commodifying promises. In short, this Article shows how
debates about the moral limits of markets, which might have seemed
peripheralto contract theory, belong at its very core.
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INTRODUCTION

Many commentators accept that legally enforceable contracts
involve promises.I But why should courts enforce promises? And which

1.

See, e.g., RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS

§

1 (AM. LAW. INST. 1981) ("A contract is

a promise or a set of promises for the breach of which the law gives remedy, or the performance of
which the law in some way recognizes as a duty."); MARGARET JANE RADIN, BOILERPLATE: THE
FINE PRINT, VANISHING RIGHTS, AND THE RULE OF LAW 58 (2013) ("Promise-based theory is still
the basis of much contract philosophy, and is also ensconced in US legal doctrine."); STEPHEN A.
SMITH, CONTRACT THEORY 44 (2004) (describing promissory theories as an "orthodox" explanation
of the analytical question of what contracts consist of); Seana Valentine Shiffrin, Is a Contract a
Promise?, in THE ROUTLEDGE COMPANION TO PHILOSOPHY OF LAW 241, 242 (Andrei Marmor ed.,
2012) ("Many, perhaps most, lawyers, theorists and lay people in the United States consider
contracts to be 'legally enforceable promises.' "); Daniel Markovits, Contract and Collaboration,
113 YALE L.J. 1417, 1448 (2004) (claiming that "[clontract presents a special case of promise" and
asserting that contractual commitments are a "class of promises"); Nathan B. Oman, Markets as
a Moral Foundation for Contract Law, 98 IOWA L. REV. 183, 205 (2012) ("[M]ost judges,
practitioners, and scholars accept that a contract consists of a legally enforceable promise.").
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ones? 2 Market-based

justifications of contract law answer these
questions plausibly.3 Courts enforce promises, according to these
justifications, because doing so facilitates robust markets that not only
tend to enhance the welfare of participants in specific transactions or
promote economic efficiency, but also because markets tend to promote
and embody liberal values like autonomy, civility, tolerance, and
cooperation. 4 As for the question of which promises courts should
enforce, the market justification suggests that promises that facilitate
or constitute market exchanges should be the primary focus of contract
law. 5 In short, contract law should primarily enforce commercial
promises. 6
Writers in the law-and-economics tradition of contract theory also typically accept the view that
contracts involve promises. See, e.g., ROBERT COOTER & THOMAS ULEN, LAW AND ECONOMICS 277
(6th ed. 2012) (calling the question of which promises should be enforced one of the fundamental
questions of contract law); Charles J. Goetz & Robert E. Scott, Enforcing Promises: An
Examination of the Basis of Contract, 89 YALE L.J. 1261, 1261 (1980) (taking for granted that
contract law involves enforcing promises).
2.
After all, no legal system enforces all promises-nor should they. BRIAN H. BIX, CONTRACT
LAW: RULES, THEORY, AND CONTEXT 133 (2012) (observing that "our legal system fails to enforce
many promises"); E. ALLAN FARNSWORTH, CONTRACTS 14 (2d ed. 1990) ("No legal system has ever
been reckless enough to make all promises enforceable."); Goetz & Scott, supra note 1, at 1263
(criticizing theories of contract that ground enforceability in the "moral force" of promises for
failing to account for the fact that "no legal system attempts to enforce all promises").
3.
Avery W. Katz, Economic Foundationsof ContractLaw, in PHILOSOPHICAL FOUNDATIONS
OF CONTRACT LAW 171, 171 (Gregory Klass et al. eds., 2014) ("Since at least the time of Lord
Mansfield, it has been commonplace to view the law of contracts as an important tool for
facilitating and regulating economic activity."); id. at 175 ("Putting specialized categories such as
consumer and employment contracts to the side, much of contract law has been developed with the
goal of facilitating exchange between business firms or commercial professionals."); Roy Kreitner,
Comment, Multiple Markets and the Justificationfor Contract, 98 IOWA L. REV. BULLETIN 20, 23
(2013) (explaining that an "eye toward a justification of contract through its role in markets and
an understanding of the political value of markets runs like a guiding thread through some of the
most important contract[] writing of the 1930s"); Oman, supranote 1, at 185 ("Contract law is the
quintessential institution of a market economy.").
4.
See infra Part I. In the legal literature, the most thorough recent discussion that describes
the role that contract law plays in facilitating market virtues other than efficiency can be found in
Oman, supra note 1, at 193-204. What makes Oman's discussion particularly noteworthy is its
emphasis on values apart from welfare maximization that are promoted and instantiated by
markets. See id. Oman has since considerably revised and expanded his argument in NATHAN B.
OMAN, THE DIGNITY OF COMMERCE: MARKETS AND THE MORAL FOUNDATIONS OF CONTRACT LAW
(2016).

5.
The instrumental justification sketched here echoes the work of Nathan Oman. See
Oman, supra note 1, at 213 ("Hence, when asking, 'What promises should the law enforce?,' the
answer is: 'The law should enforce promises when doing so facilitates markets.' ").
6.
See James D. Gordon, III, Considerationand the Commercial-Gift Dichotomy, 44 VAND.
L. REV. 283, 285 (1991) (introducing the view that "commercial promises should be enforceable" as
opposed to "gift promises"); Oman, supra note 1, at 209; see also Alan Schwartz & Robert E. Scott,
Contract Theory and the Limits of Contract Law, 113 YALE L.J. 541, 544 (2003) (arguing that
"contract law should facilitate the efforts of contracting parties to maximize the joint gains (the
'contractual surplus') from transactions" and do "nothing else," which the authors claim follows
from the principle that "the state should choose the rules that regulate commercial transactions
according to the criterion of welfare maximization").
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But what precisely makes a promise commercial in nature? This
Article's key insight is that commercial promises are commodified
promises-i.e., contracts involve, and should involve, treating
promissory rights and obligations as subject to market norms, including
norms permitting the purchase and sale of those rights and
obligations.7 The simple observation that contracts commodify promises
has multiple important implications for reforming contract law and
interpreting its central doctrines. This Article advocates, in particular,
two doctrinal reforms: First, if we take for granted that contract law
concerns itself primarily with enforcing commercial promises, then we
should demote the doctrine of consideration from a requirement to a
presumption, given that quid pro quo exchanges do not exhaust the
ways that parties may commodify their promises. Second, and more
surprisingly, courts should presumptively enforce promises when
parties intend them to be enforceable under contract law. This
surprising result follows from a rigorous philosophical conception of
commerciality stated in terms of commodification, which in turn is
defined in terms of treating something as subject to market normsincluding norms of contract law itself. In short, this Article shows how
parties can and should bootstrap their promises into enforceability, at
least presumptively, simply by willingly treating their promises like
goods subject to market norms.
But commodification has a dark side. Some things should not be
for sale. This widely shared belief is reflected in the criminal law, which
bans certain market exchanges-such as the sale of kidneys, certain
drugs, sexual labor, and so on. 8 Less widely noticed, this Article argues,
is that anti-commodification norms help to justify certain contract law
doctrines, like voidness for illegality. 9 More surprising still, over-

7.

For a similar usage, see MARGARET JANE RADIN, CONTESTED COMMODITIES 15 (1996),

which argues that "[olne of the earmarks of commodification, perhaps its central one, is that of
sale; so commodification is undercut when things are thought of as, or declared to be, not capable
of sale." See also Elizabeth S. Anderson, Is Women's Labor a Commodity?, 19 PHIL. & PUB. AFF.
71, 73 (1990) (explaining commodification generally).
8.
For the federal statute banning the sale of human organs, including kidneys, see 42
U.S.C. § 274e(a) (2012), which makes it "unlawful for any person to knowingly acquire, receive, or
otherwise transfer any human organ for valuable consideration for use in human transplantation
if the transfer affects interstate commerce." See also 42 U.S.C. § 274e(c)(1):
The term "human organ" means the human (including fetal) kidney, liver, heart, lung,
pancreas, bone marrow, cornea, eye, bone, and skin or any subpart thereof and any
other human organ (or any subpart thereof, including that derived from a fetus)
specified by the Secretary of Health and Human Services by regulation.
For some statutes banning the sale of sexual services, see, for example, FLA. STAT. § 796.07 (2017),
which bans prostitution, and TENN. CODE ANN. § 39-13-514 (2014), which does the same.
9.
For a thorough treatment of how anti-commodification norms help justify and explain the
doctrine of consideration, see David Gamage & Allon Kedem, Commodification and Contract
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commodifying some promises may undermine norms or values
associated with promising itself. And, arguably, contract law's design
does and should strive to avoid this where practicable. Indeed, the rule
against enforcing breaches of so-called donative promises plausibly
accommodates noncommercial values associated with gift promises,
including friendship.10 This Article discusses other ways that the law
already accommodates concerns about over-commodifying promises, as
well as other ways that over-commodifying promises may have led to
the breakdown of promissory norms (including ways this breakdown
may have contributed to the 2008 financial crisis). Thinking about
moral constraints on commodification thus provides a new way to
interpret the limits on contract enforcement.
Construing contracts as commodified promises has other
implications for contract theory, allowing us to reframe existing debates
about the appropriate remedies for breaches of contract. Debates about
whether contract law's remedies adequately reflect promissory morality
can be bolstered-and replied to-on the grounds that current contract
law doctrines facilitate over-commodification and hence undermine
promissory norms and values. Reframing these debates may make
them more tractable by providing a common vocabulary for those who
try to justify contract law by reference to promissory practices and those
who emphasize markets.
Arriving at these conclusions requires some groundwork. Part I
introduces the market-based instrumental justification for contract
law. This justification supports the view that contract law should
primarily focus on commercial promises and in turn motivates the
inquiry into the question of what makes a promise commercial in
nature. Part II defines commodification and explains why it matters,
focusing especially on the reasons why some writers oppose
commodification. Part III defends the very possibility of commodifying
promises, while Part IV introduces three principles that should govern
the enforceability of promises in contract law. Finally, Part V applies
those principles to doctrines of contract formation, while arguing for
their reform. Part V also shows how understanding contracts as
commodified promises helps solve certain doctrinal puzzles
(particularly involving illegality doctrine), while simultaneously
Formation: Placingthe ConsiderationDoctrine on Stronger Foundations, 73 U. CHI. L. REV. 1299
(2006).
10. See Melvin Aron Eisenberg, The World of Contract and the World of Gift, 85 CALIF. L.
REV. 821, 847 (1997) (discussing the moral importance of keeping promises). Others have observed
that expectations governing promissory obligations in the context of close personal relationships
differ from those in commercial and contractual relationships. See also DORI KIMEL, FROM
PROMISE TO CONTRACT: TOWARDS A LIBERAL THEORY OF CONTRACT (2003); Aditi Bagchi,

SeparatingContractand Promise, 38 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 709 (2011).

VANDERBILT LAW REVIEW

66

[Vol. 71:1:61

casting new light on recurring debates about contract law's remedies
and the justification of boilerplate agreements.
I. AN INSTRUMENTAL JUSTIFICATION FOR CONTRACT LAW

A widely held view holds that contract law aims to enforce, and
should be designed to facilitate, primarily commercial promises.II Little
work discusses what commerciality involves. But it behooves us to pay
closer attention to the concept of commerciality. After all, according to
the commercial promise view, the limits of commerciality presumably
limit the scope of a promise's enforceability in contract law. But before
turning to the question of what commerciality involves, let us consider
what motivates commercial-promise views of contract law to begin with.
Commercial-promise views that this Article takes for granted
presuppose an instrumental justification for contract law, 12 one version
of which holds that contract law is justified to the extent that it supports
robust market economies-or that the point of contract law is "helping
to sustain markets."1 3 Markets have many virtues that have been
discussed at length elsewhere, so I will not try to exhaustively catalogue
them here. 14

I will emphasize, however, that the instrumental justification
that this Article presupposes does not reduce to the standard welfarist,
efficiency-seeking approach favored by economists.1 5 To be sure, market
economies based on the price system are more efficient than commandand-control economies, which notoriously fail to ensure that production

11.

See, e.g., NANCY S. KIM, WRAP CONTRACTS: FOUNDATIONS AND RAMIFICATIONS 19 (2013);

OMAN, supra note 4; Morris R. Cohen, The Basis of Contract, 46 HARV. L. REV. 553, 555 (1933)
(asserting that the "development of contract is largely an incident of commercial and industrial
enterprises that involve a greater anticipation of the future than is necessary in a simpler or more
primitive economy"); Lon L. Fuller, Considerationand Form, 41 COLUM. L. REV. 799, 818 (1941)
(describing the "archetype" contractual relationship as a "business trade of economic values in the
form of goods, services, or money"); Oman, supra note 1, at 185-87.
12. Distinguish between instrumental justifications for a social practice and consequentialist
ones. See VICTOR TADROS, THE ENDS OF HARM: THE MORAL FOUNDATIONS OF CRIMINAL LAW 31-

32 (2011). Instrumental justifications hold that certain social practices are valuable primarily or
exclusively for some desirable goods they bring about rather than for any intrinsic value of that
practice in and of itself. See id. at 23-24. Consequentialist justifications go further, holding that
certain desirable outcomes, and only those outcomes, matter in justifying the practice;
nonconsequentialists hold simply that desirable outcomes do not alone matter in justifying a social
practice. See id. at 32. The account I give here thus leaves room for an instrumentalist but
nonconsequentialist account of contract law, according to which contract law exists primarily to
facilitate markets though operates within moral constraints.
13.

JULES L. COLEMAN, RISKS AND WRONGS 197 (1992).

14. See especially Oman, supranote 1, at 187.
15. COOTER & ULEN, supra note 1, at 28-29; Oman, supra note 1, at 187 (observing that
"[e]conomic theorists of contract certainly laud markets," but criticizing their "single concern: the
efficient allocation of resources").
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quotas and demand align.16 No doubt efficiency gains often translate
into welfare gains. But the virtues of markets go beyond efficiency.
Other values promoted by or embodied in markets include freedom or
autonomy (terms that I will use interchangeably here).17 Markets
liberate, and not just by giving consumers many ways to satisfy their
wants by exercising free choice. Free labor markets, for example, allow
employees to leave domineering employers.1 8 They may also undermine
pernicious discrimination. Others have discussed how markets foster
virtues like tolerance. 19 As Jules Coleman aptly remarks before offering
his own list of market virtues, "[t]here is no shortage of defenses of the
market within the liberal tradition." 20
To secure market virtues certain preconditions must be in
place.21 Large markets need a stable legal system to flourish, including
a law of contract. 22 Contract law provides some assurance that parties
to an agreement will actually follow through with their commitmentsthat a promise made now will be kept in the future-or face legal
16.

See, e.g., ROBERT KU'PNER, EVERYTHING FOR SALE: THE VIRTUES AND LIMITS OF MARKETS

12 (1996) ("Markets do a lot better than command economies at generating roughly accurate prices
in many realms much of the time.").
17. There are broad distinctions between freedom and autonomy in the philosophical
literature, as well as various conceptions of freedom and autonomy. See generallyJohn Christman,
Autonomy in Moral and PoliticalPhilosophy, in STANFORD ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PHILOSOPHY (2015),
http://plato.stanford.edulentries/autonomy-morall [https://perma.cc/9ZAS-DHJC] (distinguishing
between freedom and autonomy and identifying several conceptions of the latter). These
distinctions will not make a difference in what follows.
18.

See ALBERT 0. HIRSCHMAN, EXIT, VOICE, AND LOYALTY: RESPONSES TO DECLINE IN FIRMS,

ORGANIZATIONS, AND STATES 21 (1970) (suggesting that "one of the principal virtues" of a market
system is an individual's ability to exit firms with which one is dissatisfied); see also DEBRA SATZ,
WHY SOME THINGS SHOULD NOT BE FOR SALE: THE MORAL LIMITS OF MARKETS 24-25 (2010)

(relying on Hirschman's framework to explain how, in competitive labor markets, some employees
have the power to avoid "humiliating servitude"). Others have described the liberating effects of
market systems. See ELIZABETH ANDERSON, PRIVATE GOVERNMENT: HOW EMPLOYERS RULE OUR

LIVES (AND WHY WE DON'T TALK ABOUT IT) 1-36 (2017) (acknowledging that markets played a
liberating and egalitarian role in the West before the industrial revolution, while also arguing that
we should temper our enthusiasm given the oppressive character of the employer-employee
relationship); MILTON FRIEDMAN, CAPITALISM AND FREEDOM: FORTIETH ANNIVERSARY EDITION 7-

21 (2002) (arguing that economic freedom is a prerequisite to political freedom). Even Marx
appreciated the liberating effects and "cosmopolitan" impulses brought about by commerce. See
Karl Marx, The Communist Manifesto, in SELECTED WRITINGS 161-62 (Laurence H. Simon ed.,
1994); see also SATZ, supra, at 23 (quoting Marx).
19. See especially Oman, supra note 1, at 187 ("Markets .. are complex social institutions
that can serve multiple functions.").
20.

COLEMAN, supra note 13, at 62.

21. SATZ, supra note 18, at 26-31; see also Randy E. Barnett, A Consent Theory of Contract,
86 COLUM. L. REV. 269, 297-99 (1986).
22. SATZ, supra note 18, at 26-27; see Barnett, supra note 21, at 297 (arguing that contract
law should be seen as part of a system including an initial allocation of entitlements and the means
for their legally binding transfer). This is not to say that commercial exchanges are impossible,
even among relative strangers, without contract law. But without it the stable, robust, large-scale
exchanges of the kind constitutive of robust market economies seem far-fetched.
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liability. 23 Contract law also serves a well-known gap-filling function. 24
Because contracts cannot account for every possible contingency,
contract law supplies a wide variety of "default rules" governing
contract interpretation or default contractual terms that apply absent
express agreement to the contrary. 25 These off-the-rack default
provisions allocate liabilities when contract disputes arise and where
the contract itself is silent or unclear. By mitigating potential sources
of conflict and confusion arising from this silence, contract law's gapfilling function facilitates market transactions wholly apart from any
enforcement function.
The preceding remarks support an instrumental justification for
contract law. If we assume that a well-regulated market economy is
justified (given the aforementioned virtues), that a legal framework is
practically indispensable for this kind of economy, and that contract law
(or something very much like it) is a practically indispensable
component of this framework, then having a contract law is thereby

justified.
Instrumental, market-based theories of contract law motivate
the view that contract law should be designed with the aim of
facilitating commerce, especially by enforcing commercial promises.
The remainder of this Article focuses on the neglected question of what
a commercial promise is, which in turn requires investigating what
commerciality involves. Doing so will affect our understanding of
contract law both descriptively and normatively, sometimes in
surprising ways.

23. See, e.g., COLEMAN, supra note 13, at 20, 68, 119-20 (explaining that "[miarkets require
contracting or exchange" and emphasizing how enforcing contracts mitigates risks of
noncompliance with promises); COOTER & ULEN, supra note 1, at 284-85 (offering a simple gametheoretic model illustrating how enforceability of promises makes costlier a promisor's
noncooperation in promissory exchanges); MICHAEL J. TREBILCOCK, THE LIMITS OF FREEDOM OF

CONTRACT 16 (1993); Dori Kimel, Remedial Rights and Substantive Rights in Contract Law, 8
LEGAL THEORY 313, 326 (2002); Erin O'Hara, Trustworthiness and Contract, in MORAL MARKETS:
THE CRITICAL ROLE OF VALUES IN THE ECONOMY 173, 175 (Paul J. Zak & Michael C. Jensen eds.,

2010) ("The availability of a remedy for breach of contract provides a type of safety net that helps
to minimize the sense of vulnerability that makes trust assessments necessary in the first place.");
Oman, supra note 1, at 209 ("[The availability of formal recourse in the event of breach gives
market participants the confidence to engage in transactions that they would otherwise forgo out
of fear of exploitation.").
24. COOTER & ULEN, supra note 1, at 307 ("Explicit terms in a contract may require
interpretation, gaps may require filling, and inefficient or unfair terms may require regulation.");
TREBILCOCK, supra note 23, at 17.
25. For example, under the Uniform Commercial Code, contractual rights of either the seller
or buyer of goods may be assigned to others "[u]nless otherwise agreed." U.C.C. § 2-210(2) (AM.
LAW INST. & UNIF. LAw COMM'N 2012).
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II. COMMODIFICATION AND WHY IT MATTERS

Given a market-based, instrumental justification, contract law
should primarily stand ready to enforce commercial promises. Although
this view is widely held, surprisingly few attempt to explicate the notion
of a commercial promise. One of this Article's contributions is to fill this
gap. The remainder of this Part explains commerciality in terms of
com modification, explains what commodification involves, and presents
the ways in which commodification might be morally problematic, and
hence why commodification matters.
A. What Commodification Involves
To "commodify" something, as I will use the term, is to treat it
as subject to market norms, especially including norms permitting its
purchase or sale for a price set in common currency. 26 This definition's
most important element is the idea of treatingsomething as subject to
market norms. 27 Whatever else may count as such treatment, treating
something as available for purchase or sale for a price surely does. 28
Later on, we will see other market norms-such as contract law
itself and norms permitting quid pro quo exchange 29-and will consider
26. Cf. Anderson, supranote 7, at 73 (defining "commodities" similarly as "those things which
are properly treated in accordance with the norms of the modern market"). It is important to note
that my use of the term "commodity" is more capacious than the narrow use of the term as used to
describe tangible assets exclusively. See Commodity, BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY (10th ed. 2014)
('The term [commodity] embraces only tangible goods, such as products or merchandise, as
distinguished from services."). Some writers conflate commodifying goods with pricing them. See,
e.g., GUIDO CALABRESI, THE FUTURE OF LAW & ECONOMICS: ESSAYS IN REFORM AND RECOLLECTION

26 (2016) (discussing goods "people do not wish to have 'priced'" as items whose "commodification
is in itself costly"). But see EYAL ZAMIR & BARAK MEDINA, LAW, ECONOMICS, AND MORALITY 111

(2010) (denying any "necessary link between monetization and commodification," adding by way
of illustration that "courts routinely award monetary damages for loss of limb or life in tort actions,
without thereby transforming them into tradable goods").
27. There is potential overlap between the notion of treating something like a commodity and
the ways in which one might treat something as property, since sales, purchases, or other transfers
involve transfer of validly possessed property rights. See GREGORY S. ALEXANDER & EDUARDO M.
PEJALVER, AN INTRODUCTION TO PROPERTY THEORY 4 (2012) (observing that property rights have

been thought to "include the right to possess (which includes the right to exclude) ... the right to
transmissibility and the absence of term (potentially infinite duration)" (citing A.M. Honor6,
Ownership, in READINGS IN THE PHILOSOPHY OF LAW 557, 563-74 (Jules L. Coleman ed., 1999))).
28. See CALABRESI, supra note 26, at 26 (defining merit goods as those that bear a positive
market price).
29.

See, e.g., ELIZABETH ANDERSON, VALUE IN ETHICS AND ECONOMICS 145 (1993). The fact

that exchange signals commodification is simply assumed, for example, in Robert Cooter & Melvin
Aron Eisenberg, Damages for Breach of Contract, 73 CALIF. L. REV. 1432, 1461 (1985), where the
authors note a sense in which "the exchange of legal rights is no different than the exchange of
ordinary commodities." But see Viviana A. Zelizer, Payments and Social Ties, 11 SOC. F. 481, 490
(1996) (considering borderline noncommercial quid pro quo exchanges, such as instances where
'women received financial help, gifts-including clothing or even a vacation trip-and access to
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ways in which these norms raise moral concerns relating to
commodification of things generally and promises in particular. 30 But
unless otherwise noted, this Article discusses transactions involving the
purchase or sale of something, and hence transactions to which the
notion of commodification plainly applies.
Two further clarifications. First, like the term "discrimination,"
"commodification" is often used pejoratively.31 But for clarity I want to
separate analytical from normative issues. Just as we can distinguish
a normatively neutral notion of discrimination from wrongful
discrimination, I want to distinguish commodification from improper
commodification. 32
The second clarification is more important: commodification can
be a matter of degree. In explaining this idea, Margaret Jane Radin
coined the term "incomplete commodification" to refer to two different
but interrelated perspectives. 3 3 The first refers to how an individual
may simultaneously hold commodified and non-commodified
understandings of certain goods and services. 34 Consider a lawyer
whose firm sells her labor at an hourly rate. This lawyer might
understand that she sells her intellectual labor hourly, while also
viewing her work as a profession that is subject to nonmarket
constraints, including market-inalienable ethical responsibilities.35
entertainment from men in exchange for a variety of sexual favors, from flirting to sexual
intercourse").
30. See infra Part V.
31.

See DEBORAH HELLMAN, WHEN IS DISCRIMINATION WRONG? 13 (2008) (observing that

"discrimination" can be used descriptively or in a "moralized" sense); Martha M. Ertman, What's
Wrong with a ParenthoodMarket? A New and Improved Theory of Commodification, 82 N.C. L.
REV. 1, 5 (2003) ("Currently, one rarely reads a defense of commodification per se in legal literature
because the term itself carries such negative connotations that only commodification skeptics tend
to use it.").
32. One might define "commodification" more narrowly, say, as treating something as subject
to market norms even though it is not usually treated this way. But I think this is too narrow:
one's labor is, in a sense, usually treated as subject to market norms in some ways, and I want to
preserve our ability to correctly observe that our labor is being commodified. In other words, I
think it is perfectly appropriate to say that our labor is commodified despite the regularity with
which it occurs. So at the risk of overinclusion, I will use the analytically stripped down account of
commodification.
33. RADIN, supra note 7, at 102-14; see Margaret Jane Radin, Market Inalienability, 100
HARV. L. REV. 1849, 1918 (1987) (distinguishing between commodification from the "participant"
perspective and "social" one); see also ANDERSON, supra note 29, at 147 (using "partially
commodified" in the same spirit).
34. See Radin, supra note 33, at 1918 ("The social aspect of incomplete commodification draws
attention instead to the way society as a whole recognizes that things have nonmonetizable
participant significance by regulating (curtailing) the free market.").
35. In many jurisdictions and legal cultures, lawyers are expected to perform pro bono work,
providing free legal services to those who otherwise could not afford it. See, e.g., MODEL RULES OF
PROFL CONDUCT r. 6.1 (AM. BAR AsS'N 2016) ("Every lawyer has a professional responsibility to
provide legal services to those unable to pay."). One cannot satisfy one's professional pro bono
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Participating in the labor market more generally requires reconciling
commodified and non-commodified self-conceptions. 36
An individual's ambivalence about commodification both reflects
and contributes to ambivalence at the level of social policy. 3 7 For
example, insurance, antidiscrimination, and safety regulations all limit
38
to some extent the ways in which they may be produced and sold.
Some of these regulations-food safety laws, for example-can be
explained and justified by reference to the goal of mitigating run-of-themill market failures, by (for example) seeking to mitigate information
asymmetries and negative externalities. 3 9 But other laws-like those
banning sales of internal organs, for example-are better understood as
manifesting social ambivalence about commodification in the first
place, even if they introduce inefficiencies.
B. Why Commodification Matters: The Moral Limits of Markets
Although the preceding discussion provided an analytically
over
controversies
of
"commodification,"
definition
neutral
commodification-whether, for example, kidneys should be available,
for purchase or sale-are normative in nature. The important questions
are whether, to what extent, and how certain things or acts or practices
should be commodified.
So when are things properly or improperly commodified? To
make things more precise, let us focus on the more specific question of
obligations by simply paying another attorney to do the work instead--even if there is a sense in
which this might be more efficient or overall welfare-enhancing. The point about norms "internal"
to the legal profession extends to other professions. See ANDERSON, supra note 29, at 147
(considering "the status of professionals such as doctors, lawyers, academics, athletes, and artists
who sell their services").
36. See Radin, supra note 33, at 1918 ("What we hope to derive from our work, and the
personal importance we attach to it, are not understandable entirely in money terms, even though
we demand and accept money."); see also ANDERSON, supra note 29, at 147 ("And though
individuals may engage in market transactions in their non-market institutional- or role-given
capacities, their activities are not and should not be comprehensively governed by market norms.").
37. See RADIN, supra note 7, at 102-03 (describing how some individuals cannot understand
an interaction as completely commodified or non-commodified, and noting that it is inapposite to
think of social policy choice as fitting absolutely into either category); Radin, supra note 33, at
1918 ("The social aspect of incomplete commodification draws attention instead to the way society
as a whole recognizes that things have nonmonetizable participant significance by regulating
(curtailing) the free market.").
38. Margaret Jane Radin focuses on other heavily regulated markets, including the
regulation of labor and residential tenancies, but the essential point is the same. See Radin, supra
note 33, at 1919-20 (using regulations on the labor industry and residential tenancies to
demonstrate how these markets are incompletely commodified with regard to safety, insurance,
and antidiscrimination requirements, among others).
39. See COOTER & ULEN, supra note 1, at 39-42 (discussing market failures, including
externalities, public goods, and information asymmetries, and proposing that restricting output,
subsidies, and mandatory disclosures may help ameliorate these failures).
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the circumstances under which it is morally appropriate to treat things
as available for purchase or sale, with the caveat that treating things
this way is just one paradigmatic way to commodify something.
To begin, distinguish two kinds of reasons that have been offered
against commodifying certain things: intrinsicand extrinsic reasons. To
illustrate the former, consider some of Elizabeth Anderson's reasons for
opposing the practice of commercial surrogacy. She writes, "Whereas
parental love is not supposed to be conditioned upon the child having
particular characteristics, consumer demand is properly responsive to
the characteristics of commodities." 40 That is, products are properly
negatively evaluable for their perceived defects or shortcomings, no
matter how minor. Children are not. This kind of evaluation expresses
the wrong kinds of attitudes towards them. 41 So commodifying children
expresses the wrong kinds of attitudes towards them or threatens to
preempt the right kinds of attitudes. Or so one might argue.
Intrinsic reasons need not only be about the norms governing
attitudes or their expression. Intrinsic reasons also call attention to
what makes a good itself valuable, the right ways to value it, and point
towards the ways in which commodification of that good, understood as
either an act or practice, degrades or imperils the good's value or the
norms governing its proper treatment. 42 Would widespread baby
markets tend to erode valuable relationships between parents and their
children generally? Perhaps. As Anderson observes, parents have
obligations to nurture their children, and to help them become selfsufficient, considerate, and morally decent adults. 43 But one may allow
one's purchases to rot on the vine if one so chooses. Less dramatically,
the strong moral imperatives to help a child grow and develop do not
apply with the same force to, say, purchased pets, even though many
pet owners truly love them. Even so, a world in which commodification
of children was commonplace might very well erode the strong norms
governing the raising of children by blurring the lines between children
and pets. Intrinsic reasons against commodifying other goods have been
offered in the literature.44
40. Anderson, supra note 7, at 76.
41. See id. at 77 (asserting that commodifying children would "undermine the norms of
parental love").
42.

See, e.g., MICHAEL J. SANDEL, WHAT MONEY CAN'T BUY: THE MORAL LIMITS OF MARKETS

112-13 (2012) (describing "corruption" arguments against commodification).
43. See Anderson, supra note 7, at 75 ("Tarental love can be understood as a passionate,
unconditional commitment to nurture one's child, providing it with the care, affection, and
guidance it needs to develop its capacities to maturity.").
44. For example, widely cited empirical work on the "commercialization effect" suggests
intrinsic reasons against commodifying blood transfers on the assumption that permitting the
practice aims to encourage those transfers. See RICHARD M. TITMUSS, THE GIFT RELATIONSHIP:
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Writers often couple intrinsic reasons with extrinsic ones.

Extrinsic reasons refer to norms or values that are less closely
associated with the underlying good being commodified, but which are
nonetheless threatened by that commodification. To illustrate, suppose
for the sake of argument that neither the act nor practice of buying or
selling sex is demeaning to either the buyer or seller. Suppose further
that the values associated with sex-love, intimacy, personal identity,
and so on-are not jeopardized by allowing prostitution to flourish.
Still, allowing a widespread practice of prostitution to flourish-by
allowing a robust and lawful market for sexual labor to develop-might
perpetuate or promote the exploitation of juveniles and other
vulnerable members of a population, the illicit trafficking of humans,
sexually transmitted disease, the exacerbation of gender-based
oppression and discrimination, and so on. 45 If a flourishing market in
sexual labor promotes or reinforces these other highly undesirable and
unjust practices, then they provide extrinsic reasons against permitting
the commodification of sexual labor-or at least not without putting
into place safeguards to offset these unintended consequences of
commodification. 46
I will draw on the preceding remarks in the discussion that
follows. But I should emphasize that many deny that commodification
is wrong.47 Some writers argue that the idea of market inalienability is
untenable; that anything that may be given away for free-kidneys,
sex, and so on-should be available for sale.4 8 They reject the notion

that there are any intrinsic reasons (and perhaps even extrinsic ones)
sufficient to justify imposing restraints on alienation in this way.
FROM HUMAN BLOOD TO SOcIAL POLICY (1971); see also KUTTNER, supra note 16, at 65-67 (relying

on Titmuss's work); SANDEL, supra note 42, at 122-25 (same). Another kind of intrinsic reason
against commodification is conceptual rather than empirical. Certain things literally cannot be
purchased: it is not a conceptual possibility. Michael Walzer gives a list of "blocked exchanges"things that include certain goods that he thinks cannot be purchased or sold, including love,
friendship, certain awards, and more. MICHAEL WALZER, SPHERES OF JUSTICE: A DEFENSE OF

PLURALISM AND EQUALITY 100-03 (1983). At best, one can purchase things that make bringing
about these goods more likely, but a direct quid pro quo exchange of cash for these things is,
according to Walzer, impossible. See id.
45. An argument based on similar considerations is developed in SATZ, supra note 18, at 13544.

46. Id. at 139, 150-53 (identifying the external costs of prostitution to include disease, guilt,
marital instability, dissipation of familial resources, and moral offense, and proposing that
prostitution should not be legalized without certain restrictions and regulations in place). For
further empirical work on how markets may undermine moral norms, see also Armin Falk & Nora
Szech, Morals and Markets, 340 SCIENCE 707 (2013).
47. See generally JASON BRENNAN & PETER M. JAWORSKI, MARKETS WITHOUT LIMITS: MORAL

VIRTUES AND COMMERCIAL INTERESTS (2016) (proposing that the act of commodification is not
inherently wrong, but rather how items are bought and sold invites limitation and regulation).
48.

Jason Brennan & Peter Jaworski, In Defense of Commodification, 2 MORAL PHIL. & POL.

357, 360-61 (2015); see also BRENNAN & JAWORSKI, supranote 47, at 12-13.
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Others emphasize that the question of commodification is almost
entirely beside the point, rejecting anti-commodification theory that
presupposes a problematic assumption that market and nonmarket
relationships represent "hostile worlds." 4 9

For all that I have written so far, these writers may be correct.
And even writers who raise worries about commodification recognize
that we should not always legally prohibit morally problematic
markets.5 0 But my aim in this Section has been to describe two kinds of
reasons offered by others against at least some forms of
commodification, not to endorse any particular argument against
extending markets to where they purportedly do not belong. These two
kinds of reasons, I will argue, help illuminate some of contract law's
doctrinal features and, more interestingly, provide normative resources
to those who call for contract law's reform, regardless of whether
commodification is something we should celebrate or worry about. But
before returning to law, I will focus more narrowly on the analytically
prior issue that has escaped attention in the scholarly literature: what
it means to commodify a promise and whether that might be morally
problematic.51

III. COMMODIFYING PROMISES
This Part explains the idea of commodified promises and how
commodifying promises may in some cases be open to criticism for
intrinsic and extrinsic reasons. The basic framework will be instructive
when we return to contract law in the Parts that follow.
49. See Joan C. Williams & Viviana A. Zelizer, To Commodify or Not to Commodify: That is
Not the Question, in RETHINKING COMMODIFICATION: CASES AND READINGS IN LAW AND CULTURE
362, 365-66 (Martha M. Ertman & Joan C. Williams eds., 2005) (criticizing the "hostile worlds"
theory as creating an artificial division between culture and commerce and failing to recognize the
economic aspect of nonmarket relationships). For what it is worth, I worry that the Williams and
Zelizer critique targets a caricature. Even writers who emphasize the "cons" of commodification
acknowledge that turning aspects of our social lives into market goods or services may have "pros"
and that our lives admit of complicated intermingling of market and nonmarket norms. See RADIN,
supra note 7, at 123-24 (describing the core "double bind" dilemma facing virtually any question
about commodification).
50. See, e.g., SATZ, supra note 18, at 150 ("It is important to distinguish between prostitution's
wrongness and the legal response that we are entitled to make to that wrongness. Even if
prostitution is wrong, we may not be justified in prohibiting it if that prohibition makes the facts
in virtue of which it is wrong worse, or if it has too great a cost for other important values.").
51. Some writers have criticized anti-commodification theorists on metaphysical grounds for
being "essentialist." See Ertman, supra note 31, at 48 n.231 (citing antiessentialist critiques of
Margaret Radin's work). I suspect that this critique misses the mark, in part because anticommodification concerns can be couched in nonessentialist terms, and in part because
essentialism is neither here nor there; the concern is whether anti-commodification is generally or
characteristically problematic in a given market given some characteristic, even if not essential,
features of those markets or objects of commodification.
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A. The Possibility of Commodifying Promises
So what does it mean to say that a promise is commodified?
Although one may commodify a promise in several ways, my discussion
focuses on cases in which a promissory right or obligationhas been sold
or otherwise exchanged for value by the promisor to the promisee. The
purchase or sale of promissory rights and obligations is the
paradigmatic case of commodifying a promise.
But the thought that promises can be bought or sold initially
odd.
Consider an objection. If I promise to sell you widgets for
seems
$10,000, what you have purchased are widgets, not the promise for
them. Similarly, if I promise to mow your lawn for $100, you have
purchased my lawn-mowing labor. We can explain the purchase or sale
without reference to promissory rights or obligations.
But this objection fails. Insofar as valid commitments (implied
or express) require one of the parties to do something in the future, the
purchase and sale of at least one promise is involved. Return to the
cases. Assume that you have purchased widgets, and that the terms of
the validly formed agreement immediately transfers ownership to
you. 5 2 YOU still lack physical possession of those widgets, which must
still be delivered. So there is an outstanding action that someone must
perform, which is part of the overall package purchased by the
promisee. Even if I simply promise to maintainpossession for the time
being, this too involves a promised performance that you have
purchased from me as part of the overall deal. You obtain a right to my
commitment to do something in the future. The future-oriented
performance is characteristic of a promissory right. (Similar remarks
apply to the lawn example, given that I have to mow your lawn in the
future.) 53
Note also that promises, like anything else that might be subject
to market norms, can be more or less commodified, depending in part
on the content of the promise. 54 To illustrate, consider two transactions:
52. Whether someone succeeds in transferring ownership immediately upon forming the
contract depends on the jurisdiction in question and the relevant rules of property transfer. To
illustrate, I assume that it is possible to transfer ownership immediately upon forming a valid
contract.

53. One might respond that at least some contracts effectuate nothing more than transfers
of ownership rights-that once certain writings are complete, transfers of ownership over things
are complete. Such a document, however, is no longer governed by the law of contract but rather
the law of property, including especially the rules governing transfer of ownership. But to the
extent that an exchange truly lacks any outstanding promise yet to be performed, the law should
not recognize the existence of a contract because there are no more outstanding obligations. See
SMITH, supra note 1, at 62-63, 176-79 (arguing simultaneous exchanges should be classified as
conditional rather than contractual transfers as they lack ex ante offer and acceptance).
54. See supra Part III.
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Nontransferable.John promises to wash Bill's car for twenty dollars. John stipulates that
the promise is not transferable to anyone. Bill cannot, for example, sell the right to a car
wash from John to anyone else or give that right away as a gift.
Fully Transferable. John promises to wash Bill's car for twenty dollars. John stipulates
that the right to a car wash is fully transferable: it can be sold to others or given away as
a gift.

In Nontransferable, the initial transaction involves John's
selling a promissory right to a car wash to Bill for twenty dollars.
Because the purchase or sale of something treats that thing as subject
to market norms-the norms governing purchase or sale-this counts
as a commodification.5 5 But the stipulation limiting resale does not
allow you, in turn, to make the promised car wash available for
purchase or sale. So even though the promised car wash has been
commodified, the scope of commodification is limited. It has been
partially commodified. Contrast this with Fully Transferable, which has
no such constraint. Bill can sell the promised car wash to someone else.
The promise, since it is available for resale, is more commodified
because it is potentially available for purchase or sale beyond the initial
transaction.
So if we can make some sense of the idea of commodifying
promissory rights and obligations, and if all commodification is in
principle open to criticism (for extrinsic or intrinsic reasons), then it
follows that we can in principle criticize the commodification of
promises for extrinsic and intrinsic reasons, as discussed below.
B. ExtrinsicReasons Against Commodifying Some Promises
Recall the distinction: Intrinsic reasons call attention to what
makes a good itself valuable and the right ways to value it, and they
point towards the ways in which commodification of that good,
understood as either an act or practice, imperils that value and/or
norms associated with that good.5 6 Extrinsic reasons, by contrast, do
not focus on the nature or value of the good being commodified. Instead,
extrinsic reasons refer to ways in which commodification imperils other
valuable goods or norms, which may have a more tenuous connection to
the commodified good itself.
So what might be an extrinsic reason against commodifying
promises-e.g., buying or selling promissory rights or attempting to do

55. See supra Part III. I want to emphasize that purchasing or selling something does not
necessarily presuppose that contract law exists or that the transaction is enforceable. Black
markets and informal markets thrive despite understandings among participants that their
transactions will not be enforced in law.
56. See supra Part III.
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so? Consider an example: Suppose that selling kidneys is wrong for
intrinsic and/or extrinsic reasons, bracketing the question of whether it
is unlawful.57 Now suppose that someone promises to sell his kidney to
someone else for some money. If treating kidneys like a commodity by
attempting to sell them or purchase them is itself wrong, then any
promise that aims to facilitate this purchase or sale is wrong
derivatively. So attempting to buy or sell a promise to sell a kidney will
likewise be improper. Similarly, if selling babies, votes, other persons,
sex, and so on are improperly commodified (for extrinsic or intrinsic
reasons, or both), then a promise to deliver a baby, a vote, and so on in
a quid pro quo exchange for money or another commodity is derivatively
problematic.
To generalize, promises can inherit their status as improperly
commodified from the fact that they facilitate transactions that
themselves represent improperly commodified exchanges. When
commodifying promises is problematic for reasons having little or
nothing to do with undermining the norms or values associated with
promising itself, these derivative cases of "inherited" wrongness
represent extrinsic reasons against commodifying promises.
C. IntrinsicReasons Against Commodifying Promises: Special
Relationships
If intrinsic reasons against commodifying certain promises exist,
this means that commodifying those promises would be at odds with the
values or norms constitutive of, or presupposed by, promising itself.
Intrinsic reasons might involve, for example: expressing the wrong kind
of attitude towards promissory rights or obligations (by promisors or
promisees); valuing promissory rights or obligations for the wrong kind
of reasons; or corrupting, devaluing, or degrading social norms
presupposed by or constitutive of promising, such as the norm that
promises must be kept.
To make this kind of critique intelligible we have to say more
about the values associated with promising. Consider one such view,
which holds that one of the primary values of promising lies in its ability
to constitute and manage special relationships. 5 8 Seana Shiffrin in
57. Again, for the sake of this discussion, set aside the question of whether selling kidneys is
or should be unlawful. We are discussing the moral question only.
58. Various writers explore this theme. See generally KIMEL, supra note 10, at 27-29, 65-78
(exploring the manner in which promises foster relationships with trust and respect); Bagchi,
supra note 10, at 715-27 (explaining how the moral obligation of a promise builds an intimate
relationship between the parties); Markovits, supra note 1, at 1422-42 (discussing the promise
relation and its values and how this relation is characterized through contract law, and explaining
how this relation is doctrinally expressed); Joseph Raz, Promises and Obligations, in LAW,
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particular has argued that, to properly understand the value of
promising, one needs to first understand that the paradigmatic promise
is an extralegal one that takes place in the context of a close or intimate
relationship. 59 For Shiffrin, our ability to commit to one another
through promising involves effectively transferring limited authority to
someone else over our conduct. 60 She claims that the value in doing so
lies principally in enabling us to manage intimate relationships, and to
mitigate power disparities that may emerge or subsist between
participants in those relationships, thereby maintaining equality
between those participants. 61
If promising's primary value is that the practice helps us build
and regulate special relationships, then commodifying some promises
might stand in tension with those relationships. This in turn would
provide intrinsic reasons against commodifying certain promises to
begin with. Consider some examples:
Alice. Alice promises to help her friend (Beatrice) move to a new apartment. Beatrice, who
now has the promissory right to Alice's performance, attempts to sell this right to
Beatrice's roommate (Cathy), such that Alice will help Cathy in lieu of Beatrice herself.
Bill. Bill promises to help a friend move to a new apartment. Bill then pays a third party
to perform the move instead.
Cece. Cece pays professional movers $1,000 to help her move to a new apartment. The
movers thereafter subcontract to some third party to perform the move.

Consider Alice. Attempting to sell the promissory right involves
commodifying that right. The content of the right does not make the
commodification problematic. There is nothing particularly problematic
about a robust market for professional movers. So what makes Alice's
behavior morally problematic? A natural thought is that there is
deception in the air. It is such an unusual thing to do, to sell a friend's
right to a performance, that Alice had no reason to expect it. And if
selling the right were a live possibility, then Alice might not have agreed
to help move in the first place. This is a plausible explanation but hides
MORALITY, AND SOCIETY: ESSAYS IN HONOUR OF H.L.A. HART 210,227-28 (P.M.S. Hacker & J. Raz

eds., 1977) (proposing that principles of promissory obligation are justified only insofar as special
relationships are valuable in general); Seana Valentine Shiffrin, Promising, Intimate
Relationships, and Conventionalism, 117 PHIL. REV. 481, 502-10 (2008) (asserting that promises
both enhance and are necessary to relationships). For an opposing view, see Daniel Markovits,
Promiseas an Arm's-Length Relation, in PROMISES AND AGREEMENTS: PHILOSOPHICAL ESSAYS 295,

295 (Hanoch Sheinman ed., 2011), which asserts that the promise relationship is "opposed to
intimacy."
59. See Shiffrin, supra note 58, at 502-10.
60. See id. at 497 ("An account of promising should treat promises within friendly and
intimate relationships as central, though not exclusive, cases.").
61. See id. at 498 (arguing that "being able to promise plays a role in forestalling some
morally undesirable dynamics within special relationships and in reinforcing an important aspect
of equality within them").
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a deeper account. Why would there be deception in the air to begin with
given that subcontracting and other forms of resale of promissory rights
and obligations are commonplace commercial practices? And why would
Alice agree to help Beatrice by moving her, but reasonably decline to
help her by either moving her or being liable to help the roommate (with
whom Alice is not a friend)? The sale, after all, does not appear to be
within the scope of Beatrice's presumed authority. But why is that?
The nature of promises made in the context of friendships has
something to do with it. When I make a promise to a friend, not only is
the content of the promise important, but so are the identities of the
promisee and promisor. 62 Promises between friends aim not just to
achieve some instrumental end-moving from point A to point B-but
also to reinforce and test the bonds of friendship. In this context, the
prospect of buying or selling promissory rights defeats this purpose,
even if it would advance the goal of moving from point A to point B.
This is why we should also take Bill's case to be unusual.
Arguably, Bill has strictly fulfilled the content of the promise: to help
his friend move. But a conventional understanding of what it means for
one friend to help another to move involves more than simply paying
someone else to help him move. Notice that it would seem reasonable for
Bill's friend to ask why he chose to pay movers rather than come and
aid in the physical labor; it would seem reasonable to expect Bill to
answer for his not coming in person to physically help move furniture
and such. Now, Bill might provide a good answer. Perhaps Bill has the
flu or had an unanticipated job interview that day, and so on. But if Bill
says that he simply preferred to play video games, this is a bad reason
to not show up, reflecting poorly on how Bill understands friendships.
It misses the point, in some way, of asking a friend to help move, a point
that goes beyond saving money in not hiring movers. Friendship
involves, to some extent, a disposition to want to spend time with one's

62. Shiffrin goes further, arguing that ordinary promises are not transferable because of the
nature of promises. See Seana Valentine Shiffrin, Immoral, Conflicting, and Redundant Promises,
in REASONS AND RECOGNITION: ESSAYS ON THE PHILOSOPHY OF T.M. SCANLON 155, 164 (R. Jay

Wallace et al. eds., 2011) ("[A] promise is not simply transferable."). Roughly, when A promises B
to do something, according to Shiffrin, A transfers to B the right to decide, as between A and B,
whether to do it. Id. This means that B's attempt to transfer that right to C without A's consent is
ultra vires and presumptively illegitimate. See id. at 164-65 ('[AIll A transfers to B is something
specific about the relation between A and B, not a general power to make decisions on A's behalf.").
Although I do not necessarily endorse Shiffrin's characterization, she is surely correct that
presumptive nontransferability is the norm when the identities of the promisors and promisees
matter with respect to the underlying promissory transaction, even if that transaction involves an
arm's length personal service contract. See id. at 177 n.34 ("[A]bihty of a promisee to assign
contractual rights to another without the promisor's consent is quite limited in personal-service
contracts and other circumstances in which the identity of the party to whom performance is owed
might reasonably matter to the promisor.").
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friend and to share in burdens together. 63 Commodifying a promise, in
this case, is improper because it attempts to circumvent the burdens of
friendship.
I have assumed that Bill has satisfied the terms of the promise.
But this assumption is doubtful. To see why, consider that, when a
promise involves people in a close relationship, the friendship or close
relationship might create certain expectations about the content of the
promise. Perhaps part of the promise presupposed by Bill as promisor
and his friend as promisee is that the right to performance includes not
only a right that the move takes place, but that Bill is the mover. This
is one important way that certain promises between members of close
relationships may alter the content of the promise by default. So any
wrongness in Bill's conduct can be simply explained in terms of his
breaking the promise, without recourse to commodification.
But even assuming that Bill broke his promise, Bill's conduct
(arguably) reflects an inappropriate attitude towards promissory
commitments as such. Bill's preemptive decision to pay someone else to
move, without consulting his friend beforehand (let's say), suggests that
Bill takes the following attitude towards his promises: one may break a
promise if one is willing to pay a price. 64 But this is not the proper
attitude to take with respect towards one's promissory obligations. 65 If
63. See, e.g., ALEXANDER NEHAMAS, ON FRIENDSHIP 11 (2016) (noting one of the "indirect
benefits" of friendship as including "the willingness of friends to help one another personally,
professionally, and financially in their hour of need, often sacrificing their own welfare, sometimes
even their own life, for their friends' sake").
64. Returning briefly to the world of contract from the world of personal promises, Bill's
attitude anticipates theories according to which the primary duties of contract are not simply to
perform, full stop, but rather consist of disjunctive obligations to perform or pay damages. See, e.g.,
Charles J. Goetz & Robert E. Scott, Liquidated Damages, Penalties and the Just Compensation
Principle:Some Notes on an Enforcement Model and a Theory of Efficient Breach, 77 COLUM. L.
REV. 554, 558 (1977) (asserting that "a contractual obligation is not necessarily an obligation to
perform, but rather an obligation to choose between performance and compensatory damages"
(citing Robert L. Birmingham, Breach of Contract, Damage Measures, and Economic Efficiency, 24
RUTGERS L. REV. 273, 273 (1970))); Daniel Markovits & Alan Schwartz, The Myth of Efficient
Breach:New Defenses of the Expectation Interest, 97 VA. L. REV. 1939, 1977 (2011) (discussing the
"dual performance hypothesis" in which the promisor has a choice to perform the promise or to
transfer monies to the promisee equaling the expectation value). Writers often trace the origins of
efficient breach to Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr., who stated: "The duty to keep a contract at common
law means a prediction that you must pay damages if you do not keep it,-and nothing else." Oliver
Wendell Holmes, The Path of the Law, 10 HARV. L. REV. 457, 462 (1897), reprinted in 110 HARV.
L. REV. 991, 995 (1997); see Gregory Klass, Efficient Breach, in PHILOSOPHICAL FOUNDATIONS OF
CONTRACT LAW, supra note 3, at 362 ("The simple theory of efficient breach advances a prescriptive
version of the Holmesian Heresy."). But see Joseph M. Perillo, MisreadingOliver Wendell Holmes
on Efficient Breach and Tortious Interference, 68 FORDHAM L. REV. 1085, 1090 (2000) ("[I]t has
become commonplace to tie the economists' notion of efficient breach to the towering legal
authority of Holmes, who is incorrectly cast as articulating the idea of a right to breach a
contract.").
65. Robin Kar presents a similar example, according to which a father breaks a promise to
attend his daughter's graduation ceremony, and thereafter tries to pay the fair market value of
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there is any thought that unifies promise theorists of contract law, it is
that the core constitutive norm of promising is this: that when one
makes a promise, one must keep it.66 This implies that one shall not
unilaterally convert the content of a promise to do x into a promise to
do x or to pay some amount of money. 67 This notion-that it is okay to
unilaterally decide to pay one's way out of a promissory commitmenttakes the wrong kind of attitude towards one's promise, and hence is
yet another way Bill's treatment of the promise might be criticized on
intrinsic grounds. Attempting to view one's promissory obligations as
subject to purchase and sale rather than outright performance reflects
a degraded attitude towards one's status as a promisemaker and
towards promising more generally. It is not something that one who is
true to her word does.
Contrast Alice and Bill with Cece. The mover did nothing wrong.
To be sure, if the subcontractor is one that Cece studiously sought to
avoid, and if Cece sought assurances from the contractor that the
subcontractor would not be used, then this raises red flags. But
subcontracting is prevalent in commercial contexts. So long as the
underlying content of the promise does not change, the identity of the
service provider is normally assumed to matter little. 68
his attendance to compensate her. Robin Kar, Contract as Empowerment, 83 U. CHI. L. REV. 759,
797 (2016). Plausibly, Kar asserts that this "would only add insult to injury," since "this payment
would signal that the father considers his presence in his daughter's life at this important moment
to be fungible for cash." Id.
66. See Klass, supra note 64, at 367 ("A contractual promise creates a moral obligation to
perform, not an obligation to perform if performance is efficient, or an obligation to perform or pay
damages."); Seana Valentine Shiffrin, Must I Mean What You Think I Should Have Said?, 98 VA.
L. REV. 159, 164 (2012):
Among my objections both to encouraging efficient breach and also to presumptively
interpreting the contractual term to read "perform or pay" (or "trade or transfer") when
the parties do not explicitly specify that disjunctive is that either arrangement allows
the seller to elect that the buyer either be disappointed or find cover even when the
buyer prefers performance ("trade") full stop and reasonably believes she contracted for
performance ("trade") full stop.
67. To be sure, some promises might appropriately take disjunctive form at the outset, as
might be the prevailing assumption among perfectly rational, profit-maximizing firms. See
Markovits & Schwartz, supra note 64, at 1979-86 (identifying critiques of the efficient breach
concept but noting that many parties might prefer bargaining for performance or payment at the
outset); see also Daniel Markovits & Alan Schwartz, The Expectation Remedy Revisited, 98 VA. L.
REV. 1093, 1093 (2012) (outlining their assumptions that contracting parties are "sophisticated
and rational," that they may make choices to maximize profits, that the legal system allows
contracting for any remedy, and that the parties can verify economic values to a court). But it is
hard to understand why ordinary people-who are likewise empowered to make contracts and
whose contractual obligations, if any, are also governed by contract law-should understand their
promises in the disjunctive in the absence of any express agreement indicating this to be the case.
For discussion of a similar point, see Shiffrin, supra note 66, at 162-64.
68. But even this much-the alienability of certain commitments-seems open to question.
Mortgage lenders make very risky loans when there are thriving secondary markets-markets
made possible by the ability to sell those promissory rights to performance on secondary markets.
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Other writers, most notably Aditi Bagchi, have accepted the idea
hovering in the background of cases like Alice, Bill, and Cece-i.e., that
some promises take on a different normative character depending on
their role in close interpersonal relationships. 6 9 Call promises made
within the context of these relationships personal promises. But
assuming that a core value associated with promising is its role in
helping to forge and maintain close personal relationships, we should
worry to the extent that commodification (or any other practice for that
matter) puts the health and safety of these relationships at risk.
D. IntrinsicReasons Against Over-Com modifying Promises
Commodifying promises may not itself be problematic, but too
much commodification potentially undermines two norms at the heart
of promising, even outside the context of close personal relationships:
norms governing keeping one's promises and norms governing caring
about others' success. I take up each in turn.
Undermining Norms of Promise Keeping. To see how
commodifying promises might undermine promise keeping, recall that
in some contexts promisees may sell or otherwise assign their
promissory rights to third parties, and that these promissory rights are
thereby more commodified than those promissory rights that may not
be assigned.7 0 Although presumably assignability should make no
moral difference as to whether a promise ought to be kept, some
empirical work suggests that promisors, at least in the mortgage
context, view breaking a promise as less immoral when the promisee
was not a party to the original transaction.7 1 This in turn suggests that
promisors are less likely to keep their promises once they have been
transferred; transferring promissory rights may over-commodify them
insofar as doing so undermines a norm at the heart of promising: the
norm that one ought to keep one's promises. Indeed, available evidence
suggests that borrowers are more likely to default when their mortgage
obligations are securitized. 72 If So, this provides an intrinsic reason-

These secondary markets fueled recent financial crises. See SATZ, supra note 18, at 207-08
(asserting that the market for credit derivatives played a role in the United States' financial crises
by allowing lenders to sell to third parties with little information about the transactions, which
led banks to collapse).
69. See generally Bagchi, supra note 10, at 709.
70. See supra Section II.A.
71. See Tess Wilkinson-Ryan, Breaching the Mortgage Contract: The Behavioral Economics
of Strategic Default, 64 VAND. L. REV. 1547, 1570-74 (2011) (explaining the psychological
consequences of assigning contracts, particularly mortgages, to third parties).
72. See id. at 1580 ("The research I have presented here suggests that the assignment of a
contract, including securitization, may undermine the promisor's commitment to performance.").
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though perhaps not a decisive one-against commodifying promises by
allowing them to be alienated or securitized. 73
UnderminingIncentives to Care About Others. Another way that
commodifying promises may undermine norms associated with
promising is by reducing incentives to, for lack of a better word, care
about others and their success, even if the original motivations for the
promise were purely profit seeking. The relationship between
promising and caring is sometimes overlooked, so I will dwell on it for
a moment. Generally, though not necessarily, 74 a valid promise
represents a commitment towards a jointly desired end. 75 This is so
even if the promise is undertaken strictly for self-serving reasons. John
promises to loan Kim $1,000 at a certain interest rate, to be repaid at a
later date. Kim agrees to those terms. John's promise, we can stipulate,
is motivated solely by profit. Kim's promise to repay is likewise selfserving. Despite these motivations, under ordinary circumstances Kim
and John now have jointly desired ends.
But the nature of the commitment-and each party's interest in
following through on his or her end of the bargain-involves more than
merely the satisfaction of their independent desires. Two points are.
worth emphasizing. First, notice the content of the desires: they are
desires that others achieve the committed-to goal. The promisor wants
the promisee to succeed and vice versa. Again, this might be for
primarily self-serving reasons. John wants Kim to succeed in repaying
her loan so that John reaps the interest. Kim wants John to succeed in
paying the promised money so that she can use it to pursue her own
ends. But even though the genesis of the desire may be self-serving,
wanting another person to succeed is ultimately a pro-social attitude
we want to encourage rather than discourage.
The second point is that the desires for success may cause, or
become, genuine caring for another's success. Caring about another
person's success differs from merely desiring that success. Desires have,

73. I am not arguing that we should never permit alienating promissory rights or delegating
promissory obligations. Saying that there is a reason against doing something does not commit
one to claiming that we should never do that thing.
74. See Raz, supra note 58, at 213 ("Imagine a man who solicits a promise, hoping and
believing that it will be broken, in order to prove to a certain lady how unreliable the promisor
is.").
75. Several writers emphasize the role that promisors and promisees play in bringing about
the promised objective as a joint or collaborative rather than individual endeavor. See, e.g.,
MARGARET GILBERT, Three Dogmas About Promising, in JOINT COMMITMENT: How WE MAKE THE

SOCIAL WORLD 296, 318 (2014) (sketching a "joint decision" account of promising, which makes
sense of the fact that "even the promisee appears to take on some obligations, though not
performance obligations"). See generally Markovits, supra note 1, at 1448 (detailing "the
collaborative ideal" within contracts).
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as Harry Frankfurt points out, "no inherent persistence." 7 6 But to care
about something is to take up a complex set of attitudes towards it that
suggest, at a minimum, a "certain consistency or steadiness" or a
"degree of persistence," as well as a belief that that thing is in some way
valuable or important. 7 Roughly, to care about something is to "invest"
oneself in it and in some sense "identify" oneself with it."
Of course promisors may care about fulfilling their obligations,
insofar as taking commitments seriously disposes them to care about
fulfilling them. But, as is less often noticed, promisees who ostensibly
benefit from the promise's fulfillment also care about the commitment
and desire that the promisor actually fulfill it. While the promisor will,
if properly motivated, follow through on her commitment by declining
to give in to countervailing temptations, the promisee should be
disposed, at a minimum, not to interfere with the promisor's fulfilling
that commitment so long as it remains in place. Promisees may also
take it upon themselves to help the promisor satisfy her obligation.
Onerous mortgages, for example, may be renegotiated to ensure that
they remain mutually beneficial. On this view of promising, a standard
or paradigmatic promise takes on something like the character of a joint
enterprise, joint commitment, or shared plan.79
Promising in this light involves both the promisor and promisee
sharing a bundle of practical attitudes and dispositions that tend, on
the part of both parties, to exhibit or express the parties' respective
caringand desiring that the promise be fulfilled. And this complex does
seem to bear an important connection, though perhaps not a
conceptually necessary one, to promissory practices. The wholesale
absence of this complex, after all, would involve mutual indifference
towards promissory commitments and their maintenance. And it is
difficult to imagine what, if anything, morally important would be left
of those commitments if promisor and promisee were both largely
indifferent to them.

76. Harry Frankfurt, The Importance of What We Care About, 53 SYNTHESE 257, 261 (1982).
Although I speak in terms of valuable caring attitudes or dispositions, there is certainly a family
resemblance to a broader ethic of care. See, e.g., Virginia Held, Care and the Extension of Markets,
17 HYPATIA 19, 30-32 (2002).
77. Frankfurt, supra note 76, at 261.
78. Id. at 260. I hasten to add that Frankfurt seems to have something stronger in mind, such
that the term "devotion" seems an apt gloss. See id. But the weaker characterizations offered up
here are all I want to use for the purposes of gesturing towards the practical attitudes I have in
mind by using the term "caring."
79. See GILBERT, supra note 75, at 318 ("One point in favor of the joint decision account of
promises is that, in the paradigm case, one person makes a promise to another, and both are active
in the process of constructingthe promise.").
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Commodifying promises is not per se inconsistent with these
attitudes, dispositions, or practices.8 0 Our loan example described
earlier involved a commodified promise that nevertheless motivated
caring about others. But some ways of commodifying promises may go
too far, undermining the incentives we might otherwise have to care
about others' success. Consider secondary markets and securitization.8 1
When contractual rights are assignable, secondary markets develop,
allowing mortgagees to sell their contractual entitlements to third
parties. The mortgage obligations attached to those rights, and the
promises that constitute them, thereby become further commodified.
After all, as we saw above, the greater the scope of an item's
alienability, the more commodified it is.82
Bank-to-customer mortgage practices more readily involved
these relationships of care. Lending was local. 8 3 Banks were not
indifferent, or were less indifferent, to whether mortgagors paid on
time, given that "[t]hey made conventional loans within 50 miles of
their home offices and kept them in portfolio until they were paid off." 8 4
They wanted mortgagors to pay on time and hence to succeed. However
thin these caring relationships were, they created an incentive for
lenders to scrutinize carefully those with whom they forged these
relationships. And it was not unheard of for lenders to remain flexible
with respect to mortgage terms, allowing their renegotiation, to
facilitate this success. But if the demand for mortgages in secondary

80. Far from it. When long-term contractual relationships are at issue, far richer
relationships seem possible, as writers on relational contracts have long emphasized. Some
commentators draw on the ways in which contracts establish special relationships that bear a
family resemblance to marriage and friendship. For the marriage analogy, see, for example, Robert
W. Gordon, Macaulay, Macneil, and the Discovery of Solidarity and Power in ContractLaw, 1985
WIs. L. REV. 565, 569, stating that "[uin bad times parties are expected to lend one another mutual
support, rather than standing on their rights; each will treat the other's insistence on literal
performance as willful obstructionism ..... For the friendship analogy, see, for example, Ethan J.
Leib, Contracts and Friendships, 59 EMORY L.J. 649, 676 (2010), stating that "both relational
contracts and friendships display high degrees of trust, interdependence, flexibility, reciprocity,
and solidarity." I worry that these comparisons mislead more than they illuminate, causing
commentators to romanticize relational contracts even if we grant that long-term commercial
relationships incentivize or presuppose reciprocity, solidarity, and the like. So I emphasize far
weaker notions of minimal care that are jeopardized by easy transferability-though of course
these other values are also placed at risk.
81. See generally JOSEPH E. STIGLITZ, FREEFALL 77-108 (2010) (describing the developments
in the mortgage market leading up to the 2008 financial crisis).
82. See supra Section III.A.
83. Jie Gan, Banking Market Structure and FinancialStability:Evidence from the Texas Real
Estate Crisis in the 1980s, 73 J. FIN. ECON. 567, 575 (2004); see Ann M. Burkhart, Lenders and
Land, 64 MO. L. REV. 249, 271 (1999) ("American lenders traditionally made loans based on the
security of land located within fifty miles of their office.").
84. Burkhart, supra note 83, at 272 n.131 (quoting James A. Hollensteiner, The Secondary
Market Maintainsa PrimaryRole, SAVINGS INSTS., Jan. 1988, at S-11).
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markets becomes sufficiently high, such that a mortgagee can easily sell
on secondary markets the mortgage entitlements it has obtained or
"originated," little incentive exists (absent adequate regulation) to
carefully scrutinize the mortgager or care whether the mortgagor is in
a position to repay.86 Nor is there the same incentive to be flexible. As
Tess Wilkinson-Ryan observes:
One of the practical consequences of increased securitization is the constrained ability of
lenders to modify mortgage loans. Securitizing mortgages means that lenders often have
obligations to holders of the securities that make them less flexible when faced with a
86
homeowner in distress.

Wilkinson-Ryan goes on to note that this makes it less likely that
borrowers will stick to their commitments to repay, reinforcing the prior
claim that transferability may undermine the norm of promise keeping.
But as we have seen, it also undermines caring norms that ordinary
mortgage lending may facilitate absent assignability or securitization.
Even if original lenders wanted to renegotiate the terms of a lease in
ways that would allow distressed homeowners to stay in their homes,
while still allowing the lenders to profit, the same lenders' hands are
tied if they have sold off their promissory rights on secondary markets
or if those same rights are bundled with other mortgages, making
renegotiation practically impossible. 87 As Ann Burkhart notes, "the
personal relationship [between borrower and lender] has been
shattered by the explosive growth of the secondary mortgage
market . . . ."88
The systemic risks associated with reckless lending are by now
well known. When defaults on mortgages hit a critical mass in 2007,
market valuations of mortgage backed securities-whose values were a
function of those underlying mortgages-likewise plummeted,
triggering massive obligations under credit default swaps and other
asset-backed securities, culminating in the financial crisis of 2008.89
The causes of the financial crisis were multiple, and the easy targets
are ratings agencies that overrated complex mortgage-based
85. See generally STIGLITZ, supra note 81, at 77-108.
86. Wilkinson-Ryan, supra note 71, at 1581.
87. A parallel occurs in the context of real property ownership. On a model of ownership that
assumes that owners and occupiers of land L are the same, we can expect public interests in
environmental protection of L to converge with the interests of L's owner because the owner's
health and welfare will be directly impacted by environmental degradation. Absentee ownership,
however, severs the connection between L and its owner, undermining the owner's incentive to
protect L against degradation by removing her personal health and welfare from the equation. See
Elizabeth Blackmar, Of REITS and Rights: Absentee Ownership in the Periphery, in CITY,
COUNTRY, EMPIRE: LANDSCAPES IN ENVIRONMENTAL HISTORY 81 (Jeffry M. Diefendorf & Kurk

Dorsey eds., 2005) (illustrating the causes and consequences of absentee property ownership).
88. Burkhart, supra note 83, at 272.
89. See generally STIGLITZ, supra note 81, at 77-108.
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derivatives. 90 But the seemingly endless supply of bad mortgage loans
poured lighter fluid on the flame, making a bad problem worse. 91
Here the relevance of over-commodification is important but
easy to overlook. It was not commodification per se that contributed to
the financial crisis. Secondary markets might be a net positive, making
mortgages overall more affordable and mitigating risk to lenders. That
said, making contractual rights assignable and securitizing mortgages
plausibly contributed to the breakdown of promissory norms and
values-i.e., promising's role in fostering minimally caring, mutually
beneficial relationships. When a promisee no longer has incentive to
care about whether the promisor succeeds in being able to fulfill the
underlying promissory commitment, this undermines the collaborative
ideal that promissory relationships might otherwise foster. 92 Losing
these incentives is troubling not only for intrinsic reasons relating to
the corrosion of characteristically promissory norms (about promise
keeping) and values (about care), but also for the disastrous, systemic
consequences for the economy as a whole.
IV. CONTRACT AS COMMODIFIED PROMISE: NORMATIVE PRINCIPLES
Given the preceding framework, return to our main question:
Which promises should be enforced in contract law? My answer,
Contract as Commodified Promise ("CCF'), holds as a first
approximation:
1. If a promisor and promisee treat the promissory rights in
question as subject to market norms (i.e., the promissory
rights are commodified), then this fact counts as a strong
reason favoring the promise's enforceability in contract
law.
2.

If the promisor and promisee do not commodify the
promissory rights in question, then this fact counts as a
strong reason against the promise's enforceability in
contract law.

3.

If the promisor and promisee commodify the promissory
rights in question, but those rights should not, for

90. See generally id.
91. See generally id.
92. See GILBERT, supra note 75, at 318; see also Markovits, supra note 1, at 1515 (admitting
that parties to a contract or promise will "face constant incentives ... to pursue their own ends
more vigorously than coordination allows").
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intrinsic or extrinsic reasons, be commodified, then this
fact counts as a strong reason against the promise's
enforceability in contract law.
Before explaining these principles, let me clarify their
motivation. I offer them not as principles of contract law that are
actually recognized by courts or some other authoritative source of law.
CCP asserts normative claims about the way that contract law should
be. Now, because it targets contract law and not some other institution,
CCP does purport to track to some extent what contract law already
recognizably accomplishes. So CCP should not introduce a radically
different set of norms that, if followed, would render contract law totally
unrecognizable as such. Still, we should not expect CCP to simply
rubber stamp all existing legal doctrines in any particular jurisdiction,
especially given that jurisdictions have differing contract laws and
doctrinal wrinkles. Because the framework supplied by CCP is
normative, it is not predictive or historical: I make no claims about how
the law will develop in the future and provide no event-based causal
explanations for the status quo.
A. Claim (1) of CCP: Enforcing Commodified Promises
To begin, claim (1) holds that if a promise is commodified, then
this is a strong reason favoring enforceability in contract law. The
support for this claim flows from the market-based instrumental
justification for contract law.93 To see why, notice that if a promissory
right is purchased or sold in a transaction, then there is an outstanding
performance due. This is just to say that the promisor has sold to the
promisee a right to a future performance of an action. But this is exactly
the sort of transaction-commercial, commodified promissory rights
and obligations-that the instrumental justification seeks to promote
in order to facilitate markets and the benefits that come from them. 94
And to ensure that promises will be commodified, it helps that the
promissory rights and obligations themselves are purchased or sold,
since the purchase or sale of anything is a quintessential market
exchange. So the instrumental justification provides natural support for
claim (1), i.e., that if a promise is commodified, then this is a strong
reason favoring its enforceability in contract law.
Why not adopt a stronger thesis, that commodifying a promise
involves a necessary or sufficient reason-not merely a reason-to
93.
94.

See supra Part I.
See supra Part I.
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enforce that promise? The sufficiency claim is easy enough to reject,
since other important doctrinal requirements-such as legal capacitycan and presumably should preclude enforcement when they do not
obtain.95 But why not argue that commodifying promissory rights
should be a necessary condition of enforceability? The short answer
involves the theoretical modesty of the current proposal: there may be
cases in which enforcing promises is necessary to avoid grave injustice,
even if the promise at issue is not commercial in nature (and even here
it will usually be an open question whether recovery would be better
described in terms of tort, restitution, or some other civil law category).
Antenuptial promises may, in some circumstances, fit this
description. 96 And although courts enforce premarital agreements, it is
noteworthy that these are not wholly devoid of a commercial flavor, and
at the same time courts have exhibited discomfort in enforcing all terms
of these agreements.9 7 This different treatment can be explained, I
speculate, by concerns about over-commodifying relationships that
reflect understandings and norms at some remove from the commercial
realm (though obviously impacted by it).
This is not the last word on the issue of the enforceability of
seemingly noncommercial promises. But recall that CCP is primarily a
normative theory of contract law, so it does not aim to accommodate
every facet of actually existing legal practice.9 8 Indeed, the very fact
95.

See, e.g., RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS

§ 14

(AM. LAW INST. 1981) ("Unless a

&

statute provides otherwise, a natural person has the capacity to incur only voidable contractual
duties until the beginning of the day before the person's eighteenth birthday.").
96. See, e.g., Marvin v. Marvin, 557 P.2d 106, 110 (Cal. 1976) ('The courts should enforce
express contracts between nonmarital partners except to the extent that the contract is explicitly
founded on the consideration of meretricious sexual services."). For discussions on the topic of
nonmarital cohabitation, see Robert C. Casad, Unmarried Couples and Unjust Enrichment: From
Status to Contract and Back Again?, 77 MICH. L. REV. 47 (1978); and Anna Stgpiefi-Sporek
Margaret Ryznar, The Consequences of Cohabitation,50 U.S.F. L. REV. 75 (2016). I thank Brian
Bix for the Stqpieb-Sporek and Ryznar reference.
97. See, e.g., Simeone v. Simeone, 581 A.2d 162, 165 (Pa. 1990) ("Prenuptial agreements are
contracts, and, as such, should be evaluated under the same criteria as are applicable to other
types of contracts."). But see BIX, supra note 2, at 124 ("Many states impose procedural and
substantive (fairness) requirements on premarital agreements beyond those applicable to
conventional commercial contracts."). See also Katharine B. Silbaugh, MarriageAgreements and
the Family Economy, 93 Nw. U. L. REV. 65, 71 (1998) (observing that premarital agreements that
allocate property in the event of a spouse's death are "the least controversial" form of premarital
agreement and have been "almost uniformly enforced if properly executed"); id. ("Premarital
agreements have never been treated like ordinary contracts . . . ."); id. at 72 (acknowledging that
although "[t]his greatly oversimplifies the situation," premarital agreements "are usually
enforceable with respect to property, often enforceable with respect to alimony, and rarely
enforceable with respect to anything else").
98. Perhaps no theory could. For skepticism about unified theories of contract law, see, for
example, BIX, supra note 2, at 1, which argues that "approaches to promises and agreements vary
too greatly (both in substantive rules and in procedural constraints and remedial options) from
one jurisdiction to another, and over time, for any universal theory to be justifiable (for such a
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that CCP does not account for every detail highlights places in existing
legal doctrine ripe for reform. This major point is taken up later on. 99
B. Claim (2) of CCP Non-Commodified Promises
The second claim of CCP is a negative one. If a promise is not
commodified, then this is a strong reason against its enforceability in
contract law. What justifies claim (2)? Courts and their supporting legal
apparatus are costly mechanisms with limited resources supported by
the public. To the extent that a contract dispute arises, courts that have
jurisdiction should make sure that the dispute is something within the
purview of contract law and its core concerns. Given that contract law
should primarily concern enforcing commodified promises, courts
should only sparingly-if at all-extend their jurisdiction to claims
arising from non-commodified promises.
C. Claim (3) of CCP: Promises that Should Not Be Commodified
Recall claim (3): if the promissory transaction between the
promisor and promisee involves commodifying the promissory rights in
question, but those rights should not be commodified, then this fact
counts as a strong reason against the promise's enforceability in
contract law. The subset of promises that this claim addresses includes
those in which the promises at issue are commodified but which should
not be, for either intrinsic or extrinsic reasons. In short, CCP claims
that if there are intrinsic or extrinsic reasons against commodifying a
promise, this counts against enforceability.
An obvious threshold worry is that claims (1) and (3) present
mixed messages. Under (1), the fact that a promise p has been
commodified counts in favor of enforcing it-even if p should not have
been commodified. But under (3), the fact that p should not have been
commodified counts against its enforcement. Although this conflict may
initially have an air of contradiction, normative reasons often conflict
in law and life. CCP can go only so far in guiding jurisdictions to make
tough choices when claims (1) and (3) provide conflicting answers.
Indeed, it is one of the virtues of CCP that it explains what makes some
hard cases concerning enforceability so hard. Jurisdictions wrestling
with the question of which promises to enforce can get only so far with
theory to create more benefits and insights than costs and distortions)." See also Brian H. Bix,
ContractRights and Remedies, and the Divergence between Law and Morality, 21 RATIO JURIS 194,
206 (2008) ("[T]heories that try to put agreements with such different remedies (and different
rules) into a single category distort more than they explain.").
99. See infra Part V.
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CCP; at some point, substantive debates about the weight of the

internal or external reasons against commodifying certain promisesdebates which largely coincide with debates about the moral limits of
markets-must take the reins.
Another threshold worry concerns whether contract law ought
to take a normative stand on individuals' choices about whether to
commodify certain types of promises. That is, why should the state (in
the name of contract law) stand ready to cast judgment about whether
certain promises ought to be commodified? One might think that we
should leave it entirely up to the parties themselves; the state should
play no independent role in passing judgment. This thought presents a
serious challenge to CCP's third principle. But notice that it is a fully
general one: for any given kind of attempt to buy or sell something,
assuming no third parties are harmed by the transaction and no rights
are violated, we can still ask whether the state should intervene to
prevent that consensual transaction from taking place. Libertarians
deny that this is the case. 100 But as noted earlier, this Article does not
defend a particular answer to this question, and for all I write, the
libertarian position is correct. 101
If we assume, however, that banning certain commercial
exchanges is morally permissible, then it is a short step away to show
that declining to enforce promises for extrinsic reasons will be morally
permissible as well. After all, there is no practicable way to agree to the
exchange of, say, one's kidney for cash without one of the parties
making a promise of future performance (e.g., surgery or payment). The
point generalizes: if prohibiting certain commercial exchanges is
legitimate, then so is prohibiting the practically necessary means by
which those exchanges take place. Enforcing promises via contract law
would be just one of those practically necessary means. Similarly, if
certain promissory transactions undermine the values and norms
associated with promissory morality itself-the very morality that
commerce depends on-then there will very likely be intrinsic reasons
to avoid enforcing certain promises, too. To take an extreme example, a
promise to fully and irrevocably give up one's power to promise in
exchange for cash should not be recognized in courts of law. Further
implications are explored below.

100. See generally BRENNAN & JAWORSKI, supra note 47; ROBERT NOZICK, ANARCHY, STATE
AND UTOPIA (1974).
101. See supra Section II.B.
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V. APPLICATIONS

This Part applies the principles articulated in Part IV. Section
A argues that they point towards adopting relaxed versions of two
doctrines of contract formation, namely consideration and the so-called
English Rule. Section B maintains that CCP helps to justify rules of
contract formation that defeat validity, including the so-called donative
promise rule and the rule against enforcing illegal contracts. Section C
reframes recurring debates about contract remedies as debates about
over-commodifying promises, explaining how this might make
seemingly intractable debates more tractable. Finally, Section D argues
that the present pro-market approach to contract law is compatible with
deeply skeptical critiques of both boilerplate and the contract-asproduct theory of consumer contracts.
A. Reforming Enforceability Prerequisites
CCP holds that courts have a reason to enforce commodified
promises unless those promises were commodified improperly. This
principle allows us to evaluate enforceability doctrines as well as
suggest their reform, albeit tentatively.
1. An Intent to Be Legally Bound: The English Rule
Some commentators think the answer to the question of which
promises ought to be enforced is clear: a promise should be enforceable
only if the promisor and promisee both wanted, intended, or consented
to enforcement.102 English law requires, as an independent element of
contract validity, that contracts manifest the parties' intention to be
legally bound.103 Following Gregory Klass, I will call this the English
Rule, 104 which is generally not a requirement in the United States.10 5
102. See Gregory Klass, Intent to Contract, 95 VA. L. REV. 1437, 1437 (2009) ("In England, and
in most civil-law countries, the existence of a contract depends, at least in theory, on the parties'
intent to be [legally] bound."); see also COOTER & ULEN, supra note 1, at 286 ("A promise usually
should be enforced if both parties wanted it to be enforceable when it was made."); KIMEL, supra
note 10, at 136-39 (explaining the significance of the contractual intention requirement); T.M.
Scanlon, Promises and Contracts, in THE THEORY OF CONTRACT LAW: NEW ESSAYS 86, 104 (Peter
Benson ed., 2001) (introducing "explicitly normative terms" to explain what is required to form a
"voluntary," enforceable agreement); Barnett, supra note 21, at 304 ("[The phrase 'a manifestation
of an intention to be legally bound' neatly captures what a court should seek to find before holding
that a contractual obligation has been created.").
103. See Balfour v. Balfour [1919] 2 KB 571, 579 (Eng.); Klass, supra note 102, at 1437, 144648 (discussing Balfour and the so-called English Rule).
104. Klass, supra note 102, at 1447.
105. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 21 (AM. LAW INST. 1981); Klass, supra note 102,
at 1437. But see Klass, supra note 102, at 1438 (describing a more complicated picture, given that
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The rule, for present purposes, must be understood as an independent
prerequisite for enforceability. After all, there is a sense in which
parties who knowingly satisfy all the requirements for contract
formation in the United States thereby manifestly intend that the
contract be legally binding.1 06 But the English Rule can change the
outcome. Parties A and B make an oral agreement precisely because
they falsely believe that oral agreements can never be enforced. In the
United States, this mistake would not defeat enforceability (since
certain oral contracts are binding and because the intent to be legally
bound is not a requirement), whereas the agreement very well might be
unenforceable in jurisdictions adopting the English Rule. 0 7
So does CCP endorse the English Rule as a formal requirement?
At first glance the answer would seem to be no, because the Rule is both
over- and underinclusive with respect to the goal of enforcing
commercial promises. As for overinclusiveness, even apparently
noncommercial promises-like a friend's promise to attend a weddingmight become enforceable, provided that the friends manifestly
The
enforceable.
be legally
promise
the
that
intended
underinclusiveness problem arises because parties can, in principle,.
make commercial promises to one another without necessarily giving a.
thought to whether the promise will be enforceable in law, or otherwise
engaging in conduct that conventionally expresses or objectively
manifests this thought. 0 8 If the English Rule provides a proxy for
enforcing commercial promises, it looks like a problematic one.
But it is worth noting that CCP actually has the resources to
mitigate the overinclusiveness worry. Recall that commodifying a
promise involves treating it as subject to market norms.1 09 Notice,
moreover, that contract law itself qualifies as a set of market norms,
some states, including Pennsylvania and Minnesota, seem to recognize something like an intentto-be-bound requirement). Consideration might be construed as a proxy for intent, such that
fulfilling all the requirements of contract formation (including consideration) thereby
demonstrates intent to be legally bound. But like many proxy-for-x arguments for legal formalities,
a puzzle remains as to why explicitly providing x in lieu of the proxy often fails to count as an
adequate substitute for that very formality, especially in cases where proving x is easy. Here, the
question would be why consideration would still be necessary in cases where a party explicitly
expresses his intent to be legally bound. Issues in the vicinity are addressed below.
106. See SMITH, supra note 1, at 212-13 (explaining distinct situations in which courts require
the expression of a positive intent to legally bind parties to a contract).
107. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 21 cmt. a, illus. 2.
108. See 1 ARTHUR LINTON CORBIN, CORBIN ON CONTRACTS § 2.13 (Joseph M. Perillo ed., rev.
ed. 1993):
There seems to be no serious doubt that a mutual agreement to trade a horse for a cow
would be an enforceable contract, even though it is made by two ignorant persons who
never heard of a legal relation and who do not know that society offers any kind of a
remedy for the enforcement of such an agreement.
109. Supra Part III.
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given its instrumental justification as a market-facilitating practice. 110
So if X promises Y to do something, and if both X and Y consent or
otherwise signal an intent to regulate that promise pursuant to norms
of contract law, then they are treating that promise as though it is
subject to market norms, and hence, they are commodifying the
promise. Accordingly, under CCP's claim (1), this provides a reason
favoring enforcement, even if the underlying promise is not apparently
a "commercial" promise. If a promisor and promisee both intend that
their promise to attend a wedding will be enforceable, silly though that
might seem, they have nevertheless commodified the promise and have
thereby given courts a reason to enforce it. Thus, although
overinclusiveness may present a problem for other conceptions of
commerciality, construing commerciality in terms of commodification
mitigates the overinclusiveness concern.
But even if there is a thin, formal sense in which the promisor
and promisee have "commodified" their promise to attend a wedding,
this does not seem like the kind of commercial exchange that a typical
commerce-based theory of contract law has in mind. That promise is
exactly the kind of noncommercial promise that should be weeded outor so one might argue. The English Rule remains overinclusive with
respect to these kinds of promises, prima facie permitting courts to
enforce a broad range of apparently noncommercial promises. But even
if overinclusiveness is a concern, nothing follows about reforming the
English Rule, which states a necessary rather than sufficient condition
of enforceability. Further limiting the class of enforceable promises may
just as well involve adding another element of enforceability, rather
than revising the English Rule to limit that class. The doctrine of
consideration,
for
instance,
operates
to
further
mitigate
overinclusion. 111 So even if overinclusion is a worry, it is not obvious
that this is a sound complaint against the English Rule specifically, or
that it supplies an argument favoring its reform.
But underinclusiveness remains a worry from the perspective of
CCP. Accordingly, CCP prima facie favors reforming the English Rule.
Recall that the underinclusiveness problem arises because parties can,
in principle, make commercial promises to one another without
necessarily thinking about whether the promise will be enforceable in
law or otherwise engaging in conduct that manifestly expresses this
thought. 112 Strictly applying the English Rule might operate to render
these promises unenforceable even though they are patently

110. As is clear in the text above, I regard this as one of CCP's features rather than as a "bug."
111. For a discussion on consideration in greater detail, see infra Section V.A.2.
112. See CORBIN, supra note 108.
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commercial. This is a problematic implication if the main justification
for contract law is to facilitate markets. For this reason, CCP-and, I
believe, any market-facilitating view of contract law's overall
rationale-should discourage strict application of the English Rule. By
the same token, as I just noted above, when parties regard the promise
to be enforceable, this provides a reason favoring enforceability
according to CCP's claim (1).
Given these considerations, CCP recommends reforming the
English Rule from a requirement to a defeasible presumption favoring
enforceability. That is, courts should recognize a presumption that
favors enforcing promises when promisors and promisees intend them
to be legally enforceable. The presumption is justified by the
aforementioned point: that treating a promise as though it were legally
enforceable counts as treating it as subject to market norms, and hence,
as a commercial promise that contract law normally stands ready to
enforce under CCP (1). That said, because this reason can be defeated
or overridden, the English Rule at best justifies a defeasible
presumption favoring enforceability. 113
This is not a radical suggestion. Indeed, as many commentators
have observed, English courts do not in fact apply the Rule strictly in
cases involving commercial transactions-even if there is little evidence
of a manifest intent to be bound. 114 To get around the intent-to-bebound "requirement," courts adopt the evidentiary presumption (some
might say, the "fiction") that those engaged in commercial exchanges
intend them to be legally enforceable. English courts themselves have
in effect demoted the English Rule already-though the demotion takes
a different form.
But there are two reasons this workaround seems unsatisfying.
First, the evidentiary presumption masks what is really driving the
analysis: the commercial nature of the exchange. Indeed, on my view,
the reason that intending to be bound favors enforceability is that it
involves commodifying, and hence commercializing, the promiserather than the other way around. So my way of demoting the English
Rule has the benefit of removing the mask. Second, the evidentiary
presumption does not cover cases, for example, in which individuals

113. Reasons counseling against enforceability may in certain cases override. See infra Section
V.D.
114. See, e.g., Klass, supra note 102, at 1458:
English courts have adopted evidentiary rules that effectively preclude litigation of the
issue in the vast majority of commercial cases, which constitute the vast majority of
contract cases. The most important is the presumption that parties to a commercial
agreement that satisfies the other elements of a contract intended to be legally bound.
(internal citations omitted).
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falsely but manifestly believed that their commercial exchanges were
not enforceable. 115 These cases defeat the presumption. But I take it as
a desideratum that a market-facilitating justification of contract law
will give courts reason to enforce even these promises, other things
being equal. The role of contract law is to facilitate markets, a goal not
contingent on commercial participants' knowledge of law.
In sum, the fact that parties agree that a promise is legally
enforceable still matters in determining whether the promise has been
commodified and hence whether it should be enforceable. The upshot is
that according to claim (1) of CCP, a promisor's intent to be legally
bound favors enforcing her promise, but does not necessarily justify the
English Rule's making this intent an independent legal requirement.
CCP recommends downplaying the importance of intent in these
jurisdictions, while elevating its role-to the status of a presumptionin jurisdictions (like many in the United States) where it plays only a
peripheral role, if any.
2. Qualifying Consideration
CCP also recommends reforming the doctrine of consideration
from a formal requirement of enforceability, as it is often understood,
to a presumption of enforceability. Under the doctrine of consideration,
a promise is enforceable only if exchanged for another promise or
something of value.1 1 6 A performance or promise counts as
consideration if it is "bargained for," which means that "it is sought by
the promisor in exchange for his promise and is given by the promisee
in exchange for that promise."1 17
At first glance, CCP supports a consideration requirement. Quid
pro quo exchanges of one thing (especially currency) for another thing
are the paradigmatic form of market exchange, so exchanging a promise
for
something
else appears
to commodify
that promise
straightforwardly.1 18 But this view faces apparent counterexamples-

115. CORBIN, supra note 108; see RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS

§ 21

cmt. a, illus. 2

(AM. LAW INST. 1981).
116. 3 RICHARD A. LORD, WILLISTON ON CONTRACTS § 7:8 (4th ed. 2017) [hereinafter
WILLISTON ON CONTRACTS] ("It is therefore generally true that promises, in order to be enforceable,
need

consideration.");

RESTATEMENT

(SECOND)

OF

CONTRACTS

§

71(1)

("To

constitute

consideration, a performance or a return promise must be bargained for."). But see 3 WILLISTON
ON CONTRACTS, supra at § 7:8 ("There are, however, numerous exceptions to the rule ... involving
formal contract, and . .. contracts enforceable without consideration.").
117. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS

§

71(2).

&

118. Indeed, David Gamage and Allon Kedem suggest that satisfying the doctrine of
consideration's quid pro quo requirement necessarily commodifies promises. See Gamage
Kedem, supra note 9, at 1302 ("By its very nature, the use of consideration commodifies a promise
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especially when courts recognize a valid contract where the underlying
transaction seems patently noncommercial. For example, the casebook
staple, Hamer v. Sidway, involves a promise made by a nephew to his
uncle to refrain from "drinking liquor, using tobacco, swearing, and
playing cards or billiards for money until he should become twenty-one
years of age." 119 The plaintiff-promisee sued his uncle's estate, which
attempted to avoid payment on the grounds that there was no
consideration in exchange for the promised payment. 120 The court sided
with the plaintiff, holding that by abstaining from exercising his right
to use tobacco (etc.), he had traded a legal detriment in exchange for the
promised payment. 121
The difficulty for the claim that quid pro quo exchanges always
involve commodification is that the uncle and his nephew seemingly did
not have a "commercial" exchange. 122 The promise in Hamer occurred
between family members and was seemingly motivated by the desire to
encourage the nephew's good habits-far from the profit-seeking
motives or wealth-maximizing goals associated with commercial life.
Hamer therefore presents a prima facie difficulty for a commercefacilitating conception of the doctrine of consideration. Either it is not
obvious that Hamer is correctly decided, or the doctrine of consideration
potentially licenses courts to enforce promises that are noncommercial.
By failing to screen out noncommercial exchanges like Hamer, the
doctrine of consideration is, in other words, overinclusive as measured
by reference to the underlying rationale of facilitating commercial
exchanges.
Once we understand commerciality in terms of commodification,
we can appreciate how the result in Hamer was correct and consistent
with a refined notion of a commercial promise. Recall that CCP
explicates commercial promises in terms of commodification, which in
turn is defined in terms of treating something as subject to market
norms, especially the norms governing purchase or sale. On this view,
a quid pro quo exchange of cash for something-in the case of contracts,
a promise-is as close to a per se commodification as one can get, given
that it is a paradigmatic purchase and sale. Cash exchange is
by insisting that the promise be exchanged for something of value."); see also id. at 1321
(consideration, even nominal consideration, is necessary to commodify a promise).
119. 27 N.E. 256, 257 (N.Y. 1891).
120. Id.
121. Id.
122. For this assessment of the case, see Kar, supra note 65, at 764, which states, "This was
not an arm's-length transaction in a formal market, and the uncle's motivations in Hamer were
apparently at least partly altruistic (to help his nephew) rather than purely self-interested." For a
similar view that Hamer represents a noncommercial gift promise, see Andrew Kull, Reconsidering
GratuitousPromises, 21 J. LEGAL STUD. 39, 42 (1992).
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important, here, since currency is itself a medium that aims to facilitate
commercial exchanges. 12 3 So I think that Hamer can be readily
reconciled with CCP, even though it is less obvious whether this is the
case when less precise notions like enforcing "market" or "commercial"
promises drive outcomes. Still, Hamer illustrates nicely how CCP can
reconcile the outcome in that case with a view that contract law should
enforce commercial promises: by enforcing commodified ones.
But even if CCP can reconcile the market-based justification of
contract law, the doctrine of consideration, and the outcome of Hamer,
strictly applying the doctrine of consideration remains in tension with
CCP or any other view according to which contract law first and
foremost aims to facilitate commerce. As many have recognized, the
doctrine of consideration blocks certain contract modifications. 12 4
Under the preexisting duty rule, one's promise to comply with the
demands of an existing legal duty does not constitute consideration
sufficient to validate a contract modification; the original contractual
terms stand and the modifications are unenforceable. 125 But given that
contract law aims to facilitate commerce by enforcing commercial
promises, the doctrine operates to undermine that very goal in this
instance. 126 Another example involves firm offers. 127 These are
enforceable, but overzealously applying the doctrine of consideration
would preclude their enforcement. 128 So it is little wonder that the

123. This is not to say motives are irrelevant to assessing whether a transaction involves
treating something as subject to market norms. Exchanging a massive tract of land for one dollar
represents a gift transaction; the "motive" for this transfer is to use contract law to effectuate a
gift transaction. There may be reasons to validate this kind of transfer given CCP, since the parties
evidently want their promises to be enforced under contract law-i.e., a set of market norms. See
generally Gamage & Kedem, supra note 9. But, as will be discussed, CCP also warns that there
might be reasons against enforcing the same promise depending on whether the commodification
itself is morally problematic.
124. See, e.g., Gordon, supra note 6, at 288-90 (exploring the benefits of replacing
consideration with a good-faith requirement in contracts); Oman, supra note 1, at 215 (arguing
that contract modifications should not have a consideration requirement because they are marketbased transactions).
125. See, e.g., Contempo Design, Inc. v. Chi. & Ne. Ill. Dist. Council of Carpenters, 226 F.3d
535, 550 (7th Cir. 2000) ("[T]he pre-existing duty rule states that promising to perform a duty that
already is owed under an existing contract is not consideration, and, thus, a modification to the
contract is unenforceable." (citing 1 E. ALLAN FARNSWORTH, FARNSWORTH ON CONTRACTS

§

4.21,

at 497 (2d ed. 1998))).
126. Oman, supra note 1, at 215 ("A market-focused view of contract would counsel in favor of
allowing such modifications when doing so facilitates market transactions, even if there is no
formal bargain."); see Gordon, supra note 6, at 288-90 (removing the consideration requirement
would "keep the process flexible and serviceable and therefore facilitate economic exchange").
127. See U.C.C. § 2-205 (AM. LAW. INST. & UNIF. LAW COMM'N 2012).
128. Melvin Aron Eisenberg, The Responsive Model of ContractLaw, 36 STAN. L. REV. 1107,
1114 (1984) ("The shortcomings of [the bargain theory] are striking. For example, it unsoundly
renders unenforceable such important types of promises as firm offers . . . .").
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Uniform Commercial Code disfavors rigid adherence to consideration
doctrine for sales contracts. 129
These criticisms are not new. 130 Indeed, some commentators
have gone further, arguing that the doctrine of consideration is so weak
that it in effect permits courts to enforce even some gift promises. 131 But
this does not mean that, according to CCP, a bargained-for exchange
should have no legal import. It should create a rebuttable presumption
exchanges
bargained-for
given that
favoring enforceability,
paradigmatically commodify the very things that are bargained for. So
like the legal-intent requirement, CCP recommends demoting
consideration from a requirement to a presumption.
Although CCP favors demoting consideration from requirement
to presumption, let me point out how CCP performs better, at least
better than vague exhortations to enforce "market" transactions or
"commercial" promises, in justifying the results of certain entrenched
precedents like Hamer. The overly casual claim that "commercial" or
"market" promises should be primarily enforced unsettles, in principle,
deeply entrenched precedents like Hamer. Perhaps that is the right
result, all things considered. But it is not a necessary ramification of a
market-supporting instrumental justification. By supplying the
resources to reinterpret Hamer as involving commodification-and
hence of commercial concern, after all-CCP shows why Hamer can
coexist with market-based justifications for contract law. 132

129. See U.C.C. § 2-209(1) ("An agreement modifying a contract within this Article needs no
consideration to be binding."); Oman, supra note 1, at 215 (observing that the UCC "abolish[ed]
the consideration requirement for modification of sales contracts"); see also U.C.C. § 2-205 (firm
offers are not revocable for want of consideration for the stated time or, if no stated time exists, a
reasonable time).
130. Critics include not only those who view contract law as an instrument of commerce. For
an extended argument that the doctrine is incoherent, for example, see CHARLES FRIED, CONTRACT
AS PROMISE: A THEORY OF CONTRACTUAL OBLIGATION 28-39 (2d ed. 2015).

131. See, e.g., Kull, supra note 122, at 64 (concluding that the modern doctrine of consideration
amounts to little more than the proposition that promises to make gifts are unenforceable, while
casting doubt on even this claim, concluding that "the law would already be surprisingly close to a
rule that promises seriously made are legally enforceable").
132. Gamage and Kedem argue on efficiency grounds that, because it is difficult to satisfy the
doctrine of consideration while respecting anti-commodification norms, courts should accept
nominal consideration and should not engage in searching inquiries into the adequacy of
consideration. See generally Gamage & Kedem, supranote 9. They assume that the parties' intent
to be legally bound should determine whether a promise should be legally enforceable. But if the
will of the promisor is what matters most, it is unclear why it is worth trying to justify the doctrine
of consideration at all, let alone a specific interpretation of it. The present article turns the intentto-be-bound assumption on its head: the intent to enforce through contract law tells us that the
promise has been commodified and hence is eligible for enforcement.
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B. ReinterpretingEnforceabilityDefeaters
Let us now focus more directly on the question of the reasons
contract law declines to enforce certain promises. My main claim will be
that, even when a promise is apparently commodified, courts will
sometimes decline to enforce it for intrinsic reasons (referring to the
values or norms of promising itself), and extrinsic reasons that stand
apart from promising. In short, contract law to some extent already
embodies CCP's third claim: that courts have a reason to decline to
enforce promises that are improperly commodified. To explore these
thoughts, this Section highlights doctrines that, I argue, reflect
concerns about improper commodification.
1. Donative Promises
Let us focus specifically on so-called donative promises: promises
to make a gift to someone else, which the promisee does not rely upon. 13 3
If I promise to give you a car, full stop, or promise to give you a car in
exchange for a nominal sum that is a transparent pretext to ensure that
the exchange formally satisfies the common law doctrine of
consideration, then courts may decline to enforce that promise. Courts
do not enforce donative promises in contract law in the United States. 1 34
Does CCP favor reforming this practice? Once again, under CCP,
commodifying the promise-treating it as subject to market normsprovides a reason favoring enforceability. 135 And if the promise is not
commodified, or is commodified improperly, then this counts against
enforceability. 136 A promise to help a friend move to a new apartment,
one that is not exchanged for anything, and which both parties do not
intend to be legally binding, will not be enforceable if the promisee fails
to arrive and the promisor sues. Nothing about this promise is
commodified; nothing suggests that the parties treat the promise as
subject to market norms. This comports with the donative promise rule
so far.
133. See Melvin Aron Eisenberg, Donative Promises, 47 U. CHI. L. REV. 1, 1 (1979) (defining a
donative promise as "promises to confer a benefit by gift").
134. See, e.g., Schnell v. Nell, 17 Ind. 29, 30-31 (1861) (declining to enforce promise of $200
"in consideration of one cent'); Fischer v. Union Tr. Co., 101 N.W. 852, 853 (Mich. 1904) (declining
to enforce promise to pay two mortgages of value totaling $8,000 in exchange for one dollar);
Dougherty v. Salt, 125 N.E. 94, 94-95 (N.Y. 1919) (declining to enforce gift promise to pay $3,000
at promisor's death or before to family member "for 'value received' "). Notice that these cases
would also flout the English Rule, given that the formal requirements for contract formation obtain
and that the parties manifestly intended to be legally bound by their promissory commitments,
yet the courts nevertheless declined to enforce them.
135. See supraPart IV.
136. See supra Part IV.
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A trickier case involves a promise that the promisor and
promisee treat as legally enforceable. 137 By treating the promise as
enforceable, they treat the promise as subject to market norms and
thereby commodify the promise. 138 In these cases, CCP asserts that
there is a reason favoring enforcement. 139 Makers of donative promises
can in effect bootstrap their way into making their noncommercial
promises presumptively enforceable-that is, of course, unless there are
other reasons to defeat or override the reasons favoring
enforceability. 140 Without more, and as I already argued, CCP (1) thus
suggests that donative promises should be enforceable, provided that
promisors and promisees treat their promise as legally binding. 141
But this is not the end of the inquiry. Recall claim (3) of CCP:
that there is a reason against enforcing a promise if doing so somehow
involves improperly commodifying a promise. 142 Are there reasons
specifically relating to donative promises that cast doubt on whether
trying to commodify them is improper? In other words, are there
intrinsic reasons against commodifying donative promises? Some
writers have thought so, though without using the same terminology.
Melvin Eisenberg in effect tries to justify the rule against enforcing
donative promises for the intrinsic reason (my words, not his) that
commodifying those promises corrupts the values connected to gift
giving. 143 After observing that social practices of gift giving are "driven
by affective considerations, like love, affection, friendship, gratitude
and comradeship," 144 Eisenberg claims that making a donative promise
enforceable would muddy the motivations that a promisor has for
keeping her promise, and that it would "never be clear to the promisee,
or even to the promisor, whether the donative promise that was made
in spirit of love, friendship, affection, or the like, was also performed for
those reasons, or instead performed to discharge a legal obligation or
avoid a lawsuit."14 5 He claims that enforcing this kind of promise "would
have the effect of commodifying the gift relationship," 146 adding
gifts made pursuant to simple, affective donative promises would be seriously
impoverished, because at the point of the transfer, the promisor's motives would be
invariably mixed.... [L]egal enforcement of simple, affective donative promises would

137.
138.
139.
140.
141.
142.
143.
144.
145.
146.

See supra Section V.A.1.
See supra Section V.A.1.
See supra Section V.A.1.
See supra Section V.A.1.
See supra Section V.A.1.
See supra Section TV.C.
Eisenberg, supra note 10, at 847-48.
Id. at 847.
Id. at 848.
Id.
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move the commodity rather than the relationship to the forefront, would essentially
convert the promise into a cash equivalent, and would submerge the affective relationship
that the gift was intended to totemize. Simple donative promises would be degraded into
bills of exchange, and the gifts made to keep such promises would be degraded into
redemptions of the bills. To protect a few promisees, and perhaps a few promisors, an
enforceability regime would cut off something very important in social life, and harm
donative promisors, and even donative promisees, as a class. 147

In this passage, Eisenberg suggests that the mere enforcement of
a promise under contract law tends to commodify that promise. This
claim is consistent with our earlier one: that, according to CCP, parties
who treat a promise as governed by contract law thereby commodify
it. 148 In the passage above, Eisenberg adds that commodifying a
donative promise, in at least some contexts, degrades or undermines the
important noncommercial value of that promise. Refusing to enforce
thereby protects society's interest in having the ability to make
promises motivated by altruism 49-promises that are, as Aditi Bagchi
writes, "freely made" and "freely kept."1 50
Eisenberg focuses on the ways in which some species of promises
are intimately connected with altruistic motives and values. Others
have also emphasized that certain promises thrive in extralegal social
contexts. As discussed in Part IV, some writers observe that
paradigmatic promissory relationships occur within the context of close,
personal, private, or otherwise intimate relationships. 15 1 Legal
enforceability determines, and hence has the ability to change, a
promise's normative character or value. Aditi Bagchi asserts-more
generally and independently of the donative promise rule-that norms
that apply to commercial promises differ fundamentally from what she
calls "private promises." 152 And we should expect them to: all parties in
commercial contexts are normally expected to be motivated to advance
their own self-interest, so it is fully appropriate that the norms
governing these kinds of promises seek to maximize overall welfare as
between two self-interested agents. 153 Dori Kimel also emphasizes the
role that enforceability plays in promoting and facilitating the value of

147. Id.
148. See supra Section V.A.1.
149. Gordon, supra note 6, at 286:
The commercial-gift dichotomy ... distinguishes between transactions based on selfinterest, in which the promisor can be presumed to self-protect, and transactions based
on altruism, in which the promisor is thinking more about the donee's interests than
his own. The law can protect the promisor's interests in altruistic transactions.
150. Bagchi, supra note 10, at 710.
151. Id. at 726-27; see also KIMEL, supra note 10, at 57-89; Shiffrin, supra note 58, at 497.
152. Bagchi, supra note 10, at 710.
153. Id. at 722.
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maintaining arm's length relationships. 1 54 This is useful for building
trust between contracting strangers, especially where there is relatively
little beforehand; but this same function of contracts threatens to create
social distance between intimates when the parties raise the prospect
of legal enforceability.
Although this is not the place to engage in an extended
discussion of Bagchi's and Kimel's views, my main quibble is that they
emphasize the wrong things: it is not legal enforceability per se that
affects a promise's normative character or value, it is the
commodification-i.e., the applicationof market norms and expectations
to interpersonalrelationshipsand commitments that does most of the
explanatory work. After all, even though marital commitments are in
marriage cements intimate
some sense legally enforceable,
interpersonal relationships rather than rendering them arm's length
ones. Closer to the mark is Eisenberg, who points out the ways that
commodifying a promise threatens to alter the normative character of
the promise itself-such as through degrading gift promises by blotting
out the altruistic motives that ideally drive them. 155 Nonenforcement of
donative promises not only protects these altruistic impulses, it avoids
snuffing out of existence the very donative aspect of the promise that
was attempted in the first place.
Again, this is not to say that Eisenberg is correct. 156 But if he is,
then according to CCP's claim (3), there is a reason against enforcing
donative promises, since doing so would be tantamount to enforcing an
improperly commodified promise. And in cases where both parties want
a donative promise to be enforced, yet that promise is improperly
commodified, then there are strong reasons both favoring and
disfavoring enforcement. CCP itself does not decide how these cases
should be resolved as a matter of doctrinal design. But if the legal
system holds that the intrinsic reasons against enforcement are
weightier, then a strong rule against enforcing donative promises would
prevail. Jurisdictions in the United States arguably have this kind of
regime. Alternatively, if the system adopts the view that commodifying
a promise by the promisor and promisee provides a weightier reason
favoring enforceability despite any reasons against enforcement, then
no strict rule against enforcing donative promises will be adopted.

154. KIMEL, supra note 10, at 57-89.
155. Eisenberg, supra note 143, at 848-49.
156. For doubts about widely assumed distinctions between gifts and exchanges, see generally
Carol M. Rose, Giving, Trading, Thieving, and Trusting: How and Why Gifts Become Exchanges
and (More Importantly) Vice Versa, 44 FLA. L. REV. 295 (1992).
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2. Illegality and Public Policy
Earlier we saw that some reasons against commodifying
promises are extrinsic and derivative, bearing little relation to the value
and normative character of promises as such. 15 7 Rather, extrinsic
reasons disfavor commodifying promises because doing so would
facilitate exchanges that are improper for other reasons. If one should
not sell one's kidneys, one should not sell a promise to do so. Contract
law plays no direct role in prohibiting or highly regulating the
commodification of kidneys or other bodily organs-or other goods or
services that are arguably not properly commodified. Criminal law and
other regulatory domains perform that job.15 8 Contract law remains
primarily about enforcing commercial, commodified promises with the
aim of facilitating markets. Courts should remain cognizant of contract
law's subject-matter jurisdiction, so to speak.
But contract law is not wholly silent either. It contains doctrines
that authorize courts to decline to enforce certain promissory rights
that, in effect, are commodified improperly for extrinsic reasons. The
most obvious doctrine is that contract terms are void to the extent that
they are unlawful. 15 9 Another doctrine holds that contracts are
unenforceable to the extent that they are contrary to public policy. 160
Under both doctrines, kidney sales contracts would not be enforceable.
These doctrines authorize courts to decline to enforce promises, in
effect, in cases where promises have been commodified improperly-at
least as judged by other areas of law. The doctrines ensure that courts
do not facilitate certain morally problematic markets.
CCP's third claim can help justify these doctrines. To see why,
focus on illegality doctrine. One obvious justification for it flows from
rule-of-law concerns. The law should not create self-undermining
incentives for unlawful behavior. Recognizing and enforcing contracts
according to which parties are required to engage in illegal activity
encourages people to form and follow through with unlawful contracts.
The rule of law also requires that the state should not place individuals

157. See supra Part III.
158. See supranote 8 and accompanying text.
159. See, e.g., CAL. CIV. CODE § 1598 (West 2017) ("Where a contract has but a single object,
and such object is unlawful, whether in whole or in part, or wholly impossible of performance, or
so vaguely expressed as to be wholly unascertainable, the entire contract is void.").
160. See, e.g., Hurd v. Hodge, 334 U.S. 24, 34-35 (1948):
The power of the federal courts to enforce the terms of private agreements is at all times
exercised subject to the restrictions and limitations of the public policy of the United
States as manifested in the Constitution, treaties, federal statutes, and applicable legal
precedents. Where the enforcement of private agreements would be violative of that
policy, it is the obligation of courts to refrain from such exertions of judicial power.
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under incompatible legal obligations. 16 1 Contracts with illegal terms do
precisely this, since contractual obligations are legal obligations, and
illegal contractual obligations are legal obligations to perform illegal
acts. Finally, the state should avoid being complicit and dirtying its
hands by facilitating unlawful transactions or expressing approval
thereof. The state, when it acts, should strive to act with integrity.
All of these considerations play an important role in justifying
the rules against enforcing unlawful contracts or contracts
contravening public policy. But notice that rule-of-law concerns are not
obviously decisive in explaining and justifying those rules. For one
thing, neither the goal of avoiding state complicity nor concerns about
"dirty hands" automatically yield the conclusion that the state should
take no part in validating the underlying transaction. Tax law allows
the IRS to collect payment from illegal transactions, despite any
concerns about complicity or dirty hands.1 62 For the purposes of
collecting taxes, the federal government therefore treats these illicit
transactions as sources of income. Implicitly, the IRS's policy allows
other arms of law enforcement to regulate the underlying illicit trade.
Contract law could have been designed in the same spirit,
ignoring illegality and awarding damages for breaches of these
contracts, leaving it to the jurisdiction of the criminal prosecutors to
stop illegal trade. A weaker approach would permit courts to provide
partial recognition of the promisee's rights by awarding only nominal
damages, yet refusing to award full expectation damages or specific
performance. But with few exceptions, contract law does not permit

161. LON L. FULLER, THE MORALITY OF LAW 65-70 (rev. ed. 1969); see also Colleen Murphy,
Lon Fuller and the Moral Value of the Rule of Law, 24 LAw & PHIL. 239, 240-41 (2005) (describing
Fuller's requirement that law avoid contradictory demands as a requirement of the rule of law).
162. James v. United States, 366 U.S. 213, 218 (1961) ("It had been a well-established
principle ... that unlawful, as well as lawful, gains are comprehended within the term 'gross
income.' "); INTERNAL REVENUE SERV., YOUR FEDERAL INCOME TAX: FOR INDIVIDUALS 96 (2016),

https://www.irs.gov/pub/irs-pdf/pl7.pdf [https://perma.cc/DC4N-DT8J] ("Income from illegal
activities, such as money from dealing illegal drugs, must be included in your income on Form
1040, line 21, or on Schedule C or Schedule C-EZ (Form 1040) if from your self-employment
activity."). Of course there are differences: if the overall aim is to deter rather than promote illegal
trade, then collecting taxes from illegal income and declining to enforce illegal contracts are not
necessarily inconsistent strategies. Taxing illegal income is a way of accounting for it and for
ferreting out individuals who fail to pay and to avoid subsidizing it and "punishing" those who
earn lawful income. Famously, Al Capone was convicted of tax evasion. Meyer Berger, Capone
Convicted of Dodging Taxes; May Get 17 Years, N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 18, 1931),
http://www.nytimes.com/learning/generallonthisday/big/1017.html#article
[https://perma.cc/
EG9K-LJW9]. Meanwhile, declining to enforce illegal contracts or even give them public
recognition will, in theory, make procurement of these contracts less likely. That said, nominal
damages awards for breach of contract in such cases might very well uphold the principle that
generally one should uphold one's promises, yet fails to award meaningful compensation. In turn,
nominal damages might provide the accountability and deterrence benefits that collecting taxes
from illegal income claims.
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courts to enforce illegal contracts or contracts that run contrary to
public policy. 163 This is to say that promises to perform proscribed
activity are not enforceable in virtue of the fact that the underlying
trade is banned. So rule-of-law considerations do not necessarily tell the
whole justificatory story.
This is where CCP might help justify the rule against enforcing
illegal contracts. In addition to strong rule-of-law reasons against
enforcing these contracts, CCP's third claim-the idea that contract law
has a strong reason against enforcing promises that are improperly
commodified-also helps to justify the illegality doctrine. The extrinsic
reasons that they are improperly commodified might be the very fact
that the legal system elsewhere recognizes them as such. Courts that
enforce contract law may lack the institutional competence to
determine on a case-by-case basis whether this or that good or service
should be treated as appropriately subject to purchase, sale, or some
other form of quid pro quo exchange. But if another area of law codifies
public disapproval of certain markets, then this suggests that the
underlying transaction involves improper commodification. The
impropriety of (say) selling kidneys provides extrinsic reasons,
whatever they are, for refusing to enforce promises to engage in this
exchange. If so, then CCP's claim (3) provides an additional reason
against recognizing enforceability: that because the parties to the
contract improperly commodify promissory rights and obligations, the
court has a reason not to enforce them. The reasons are extrinsic since
they do not bear a close relation to promising per se; they have to do
primarily with the propriety of the underlying transaction.
To summarize, rule-of-law considerations are consistent with
CCP and may be the most important justification for illegality and
public policy doctrines against enforcing promises. But the rule of law
does not appear to suffice to explain why courts generally decline to
enforce promises rather than to, say, recognize nominal relief in a way
that would avoid creating substantial incentives to break the law. CCP
helps to close the justificatory gap, serving to amplify the import of ruleof-law justifications, as well as supplementing them with extrinsic
reasons
against
commodifying
promises-reasons
against
commodification recognized by other areas of law.
163. See, e.g., sources cited supra notes 159 and 160. For the exceptions, see 8 WILLISTON ON
CONTRACTS, supra note 116, § 19:76, which explains:
In some instances, a sound public policy may demand either the enforcement of an
executory illegal agreement or the rescission of an executed one, such as when a denial
of such relief by the courts would work a forfeiture disproportionate to the social
interest supporting the public policy, or result in harm to those for whose protection
such agreements are declared illegal.
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C. Debates About ContractLaw's Remedies
The view that contracts commodify promises also offers a new
lens through which to view and extend existing debates about contract
law's remedies. Without trying to resolve any disagreements, this
Section shows how thinking about remedies in terms of over- and
under-commodification might open up new avenues for these debates,
while mitigating the looming worry that promise theories of contract
law are excessively moralistic.
The relevant debates concern the expectation measure of
damages and its critics. Expectation damages, the standard default
remedy for breaches of contract, aim to provide the monetary benefit of
the bargain to the nonbreaching party-to place the promisee in the
financial position she would have occupied had the promisor actually
performed. 16 4 Notably, damages are usually awarded even in cases
where specific performance might come closer to providing the benefit
of the bargain, and even in cases where that performance is still
practicable.
One criticism of this arrangement points out that contract law's
strong preference for expectation damages (rather than specific
performance) fails to adequately protect promissory interests. 165 One
version of this criticism focuses on deterrence, emphasizing that
promisors willing to pay the price will not be deterred by expectation
damages when a better offer comes along, encouraging opportunistic
breaches. 166 This criticism gains traction given that contract law makes
it difficult to obtain specific performance and strictly declines to award
punitive damages, even though both forms of relief would provide
additional disincentives for breaching. 16 7 That is, when one makes a
promise, one promises to perform, full stop, not merely to perform or
pay damages; a default rule of expectation damages reflects or
164. See, e.g., First Nat'1 State Bank v. Commonwealth Fed. Say. & Loan Ass'n, 610 F.2d 164,
174 (3d Cir. 1979); 24 WILLISTON ON CONTRACTS, supranote 116, § 64:1.
165. See, e.g., Seana Valentine Shiffrin, The Divergence of Contract and Promise, 120 HARV.
L. REV. 708, 722-24 (2007).

166. See, e.g., id.
167. See, e.g., id. But sometimes there is an "exception" to the no-punitive-damages rule where
there is an independent tort capable of grounding a punitive damages claim. For an early
discussion of this exception, see Laurence P. Simpson, Punitive Damages for Breach of Contract,
20 OHIO ST. L. J. 284 (1959), which traces the origin of the independent-tort exception in the United
States to a case decided in South Carolina in 1904. Importantly, Canada has upheld punitive
damages awards in exceptional cases, so I must qualify any suggestion that all common law
jurisdictions decline to uphold punitive damages awards-at least to the extent that the Canadian
cases can be fairly construed to not require an independent tort for recovery of punitive damages.
See, e.g., Whiten v. Pilot Ins. Co., [2002] S.C.R. 595, 596 (Can.) (involving "exceptionally
reprehensible" conduct of defendant insurance company). I thank Fred Wilmot-Smith for the
Whiten case.
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encourages the judgment that a promise's content is the latter rather
than the former.168
Another version of the criticism, more distinctively associated
with Seana Shiffrin's work, focuses on the rationale sometimes offered
to bolster the law's strong preference both for expectation damages and
against supercompensatory relief. 169 The rationale, sometimes stated in
terms of efficient breach, insists that it is desirable to allow people to in
effect buy their way out of contractual commitments, even if parties in
a particular contract do not prefer buyouts. 170 As Shiffrin argues, this
thought conflicts with the right way to understand the demands of our
promissory commitments, which normally must be kept despite better
offers that come along. 171 So the reasoning offered by the law in favor of
the expectation measure, taken in isolation at least, is strikingly at odds
with the moral reasoning of morally virtuous agents, which the law
should try to accommodate. 17 2
These arguments favor reforming contract law's remedies
regime. One proposal recommends a default of specific performance
rather than expectation damages, since specific performance (it is
claimed) comes closer to protecting promissory rights; 173 after all,
promises require performance where possible, rather than cash
payment.174 And if making amends for one's broken promise requires
bringing about the closest thing to actual performance, then specific
performance (where possible) still looks like the most-favored remedy
from the promissory perspective. Indeed, some promise theorists and

168. Efficient breach theory drew early inspiration from Holmes, supra note 64, at 462 ('The
duty to keep a contract at common law means a prediction that you must pay damages if you do
not keep it,-and nothing else."). But see Perillo, supra note 64, at 1090 ("[I]t has become
commonplace to tie the economists' notion of efficient breach to the towering legal authority of
Holmes, who is incorrectly cast as articulating the idea of a right to breach a contract.").
169. See, e.g., Shiffrin, supra note 66, at 162-64; Shiffrin, supra note 165.
170. See Klass, supra note 64, at 367 (claiming that the "simple theory" of efficient breach
sought to provide a justification for expectation damages as a default remedy); see also Markovits
& Schwartz, supra note 67 (denying that efficient breach involves a "breach" by reinterpreting
contractual obligations as disjunctive obligations to perform or pay compensation).
171. See Shiffrin, supra note 66, at 164 ("Whereas the contract is supposed to represent a
voluntary relation between parties, the efficient breach argument permits the seller to dictate the
terms to the buyer and to unilaterally shift to the promisee the task of securing a substitute
performance.").
172. See Shiffrin, supra note 165, at 727-29.
173. See, e.g., LOUIS KAPLOW & STEVEN SHAVELL, FAIRNESS VERSUS WELFARE 160 (2002)

("Based on their rationales for the promise-keeping notion, one might imagine that the theory's
proponents would have a preference for a remedy of specific performance-requiring the contract
to be performed-for such a remedy amounts to a requirement that the promisor keep his word.").
174. But see Jody S. Kraus, The Correspondenceof Contract and Promise, 109 COLUM. L. REV.
1603 (2009) (arguing that an account of promissory morality grounded in personal sovereignty
justifies expectation damages as the default remedy).
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their critics share this view about what promise-based theories of
contract law should imply.

175

Taken as "merely" moral concerns, these criticisms and calls for
reform may fall on deaf ears. Although Shiffrin has carefully argued
that the state must accommodate the morally virtuous without
necessarily enforcing moral virtue directly,1 76 one may still worry about
excessive moralism in the realm of commercial contracts. Or, as others
have argued, one may claim that morality's demands in the market
context simply differ without doing so in a pernicious way. 177 But if we
express the promise theorist's worries about the design of contract law
in terms of concerns about the proper scope of the market, these same
elisions seem more difficult to accept, at least if we accept that the state
plays a legitimate role in regulating markets and limiting
commodification. The legitimacy of regulating putatively interpersonal
promises lies, in part, on reformulated versions of the promise theorist's
criticisms, stated in terms of the state's legitimate power to reasonably
regulate market transactions.
So how do we articulate commodification-based objections to
contract law's remedies framework to avoid excessive moralism?
Consider a trilemma grounded not primarily in the claim that contract
law's remedial regime fails to adequately protect promissory rights, but
rather in the claim that that regime either over- or under-commodifies
those rights. 178
Begin with the first horn of the trilemma: the idea that contract
law fails to adequately respect the nature of promissory rights qua
commodities. This horn needs an additional, contestable assumption to
175. See, e.g., Klass, supra note 64, at 367 n.14 ("Many authors assume or argue that the
morality of promising recommends specific performance, disgorgement, or punitive damages for
breach."); Shiffrin, supranote 165, at 722-23. Originally, Charles Fried claimed that expectation
damages supplied the most natural remedy for breach of contract. See FRIED, supra note 130, at
18. But this opinion was repeatedly criticized. See, e.g., KIMEL, supra note 10, at 95 (criticizing
Fried's "neglect of specific performance"); see also KAPLOW & SHAVELL, supra note 173, at 160, 161
n.18 (pointing out that although promise theorists of contract should "have a preference for a
remedy of specific performance-requiring the contract to be performed-for such a remedy
amounts to a requirement that the promisor keep his word," Fried "does not even mention specific
performance as an alternative to expectation damages"). Fried eventually agreed with this
criticism. See Charles Fried, Contract as Promise Thirty Years On, 45 SUFFOLK U. L. REV. 961, 968
(2012) ("Both the moral criticism and the economic defense of expectation damages persuade me
that I had overstated the case for the connection between the promise principle and expectation
damages. . . .").
176. See Shiffrin, supra note 165.
177. See KIMEL, supranote 10, at 22-27; Bagchi, supra note 10.
178. At the risk of oversimplifying, there is some indication that Shiffrin's critique is shifting
to a concern that contract law is in a sense too "privatized," language that resonates with the worry
about over-commodifying promises. See Seana Valentine Shiffrin, Remedial Clauses: The
Overprivatization of Private Law, 67 HASTINGS L.J. 407 (2016) (arguing against overzealous
enforcement of remedial clauses).
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get going: that all commodities are property. If so, then contract law
protects these proprietary rights very weakly as compared to others in
a way that undermines their status as such. That is, the first horn
insists that contract law does not treat commodified promissory rights
in the same way it treats other commodities as a form of property rights,
suggesting that these rights receive second-class treatment qua
commodities.
Let me explain. Assume for the sake of argument that all
commodities-all things available for purchase or sale-are a form of
property. 179 Now notice the standard civil remedies available for
violations of property rights. Protection of property rights-both
tangible and intangible-is associated with readily available injunctive
relief. 180 If someone is trespassing on land, intentionally or not, a court
order permitting the forcible removal of the trespasser is available as a
matter of course. 18 1 Even intellectual property rights are routinely
protected by injunctive relief: courts may order the destruction of
illicitly printed books.182 And property rights, when willfully violated,
can be enforced with punitive damages. 183
But if contractual rights are simply a form of property rights,
then the common law treats them incongruously. Punitive damages are
not available in contract, even for intentional or opportunistic breaches
of contract. 184 Once again, injunctive relief (specific performance) for

179. Some scholars ground their theories of contract law in this assumption. See, e.g., Peter
Benson, ContractAs a Transfer of Ownership, 48 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1673 (2007); Andrew S.
Gold, A Property Theory of Contract, 103 NW. U. L. REV. 1 (2009).
180. Guido Calabresi and Douglas Melamed famously regarded the availability of injunctive
relief as an earmark of property rules, according to which one's entitlement may not be divested
except via voluntary exchange; protecting an entitlement with an injunction allows courts to undo
nonvoluntary divestitures. See Guido Calabresi & A. Douglas Melamed, PropertyRules, Liability
Rules, and Inalienability: One View of the Cathedral, 85 HARV. L. REV. 1089, 1092, 1116 (1972).
181. See id. at 1116, 1127.
182. 17 U.S.C. § 502(a) (2012) (permitting courts to issue reasonable injunctions to protect
copyrights); 17 U.S.C. § 503(b) (permitting courts to order the destruction of infringing copies or
phonorecords); 17 U.S.C. § 506 (articulating criminal offenses for copyright infringement).
183. See Calabresi & Melamed, supra note 180, at 1124-27.
184. See BIX, supra note 2, at 99 ('There are three measures of money damages available, from
which the plaintiff must usually make an election: expectation damages, reliance damages, and
restitution."); see also Applied Equip. Corp. v. Litton Saudi Arabia Ltd., 869 P.2d 454, 460 (Cal.
1994) (observing a "limitation on available [consequential] damages [like that for punitive
damages]" and opining that the limitation "serves to encourage contractual relations and
commercial activity by enabling parties to estimate in advance the financial risks of their
enterprise"). As an aside, this is not a compelling rationale. First, we might simply fix a percentage
of punitive damages by reference to the underlying expectation damages to enhance predictability,
and second, it is not obvious why we should worry about commercial certainty for opportunistic
breachers. For the latter point, see Solbne Rowan, Reflections on the Introduction of Punitive
Damages for Breach of Contract, 30 OXFORD J. LEGAL STUD. 495, 500 (2010), which argues that
"[plredictability would be unaffected for upstanding businesses which aim to discharge their
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nonperformance of contractual obligations is the exception, not the rule;
the standard remedy is expectation damages. This is incongruous if
promissory rights are construed as a form of property rights; it is
tantamount to allowing the breaching party to appropriate the
promisee's property without consent.
Of course these features of contract law are peculiar to (most)
common law jurisdictions. Civil law jurisdictions, at least formally,
appear more receptive to imposing specific performance and punitive
damages. 185 So if contractual promises are commodified promises, and
if commodities are a form of property, then we have a prima facie case
in favor of adopting a civil law approach to contract law remedies. Doing
so better respects property rights and their consistent treatment under
law-and, ironically, also involves strengthening contractual rights in
precisely the ways advocated by promise theorists like Shiffrin.
So much for the first horn of the trilemma, which essentially
argues that contract law under-commodifies promissory rights. Now
consider the second horn, which insists that contract law's remedies
currently over-commodify those rights. Recall that some promise
theorists worry about either creating incentives for opportunistic and/or
efficient breaches or embracing rationales endorsing these kinds of
breaches. The overarching worry is that someone willing and able to
pay her way out of a commitment will simply pay the price to do so at
her discretion. As noted above, this promotes or expresses the wrong
kind of attitude towards promissory obligations, which (unless
otherwise stipulated) are promises to perform, full stop, not promises to
perform or purchase a buyout. 186 Because the worry expressed here
points out the risks of commodifying promises in a way that tends to
undermine respect for central features of promissory morality itself,
this represents an intrinsic reason against commodifying promises in
this way. Ironically, on this view, strengthening contractual rights
reflects a way of reining in over-commodification that threatens to
degrade or corrupt promissory practices. Indeed, something like a
commodification critique resonates with the kinds of concerns that

contractual obligations. Those in wilful default, in contrast, are not deserving of certainty and
should not be heard to complain."
185. See 25 WILLISTON ON CONTRACTS, supra note 116, § 67:1 ("In some civil law jurisdictions,
specific performance is a substantive right, and is the preferred remedy for the breach of a
contract.").

186. For an intriguing discussion of the possibility that all awards of damages, even in the
torts context, risk commodifying rights violations, see Margaret Jane Radin, Compensation and
Commensurability, 43 DuKE L.J. 56 (1993). But see ZAMIR & MEDINA, supranote 26, at 111 (using
money damages awards as evidence against the claim that there is any "necessary link between
monetization and commodification").
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Shiffrin has recently raised in her work on remedial clauses, which
raises concerns about the "overprivatization" of contract law. 187
The first two horns of this trilemma, though mutually
incompatible, employ worries about commodification that put pressure
on contract law's status quo remedial regime. But a defender of the
status quo need not accept either of the first two horns. Consider this
argument: perhaps the common law remedial regime is itself designed
to prevent improper commodification. One concern motivating weak
enforcement of specific performance, and nonenforcement of punitive
damages, is the risk of routinely allowing plaintiffs to force individuals
to perform certain personal services contracts against their will. This
looks like forced labor.188 And this treads too closely to paradigmatic
examples of improper commodification, like bonded labor and chattel
slavery. More generally, where proprietary rights in another person's
labor are concerned, there is good reason for the remedies used to
enforce those rights not to be too rigorous. Contract law should not be
used to enlist others in de facto slavery or indentured servitude, or
anything close to that. The commodification that contract law
indulges-the fact that labor is turned into expectation damages or
reliance damages in lieu of actual court-enforced labor-actually aims
to prevent improper commodification, rather than to undermine
proprietary rights.
Again, it is not my present aim to settle the dispute between
those who endorse a more robust enforcement regime and those who
think that the current array of remedies in common law jurisdictions
works just fine. But notice that defenders of the status quo arrangement
risk being Panglossian. This is the third horn of the trilemma. It might
be surprising to think that the current array of remedies in the United
States reflects the best or optimal degree of commodification of
promissory rights, given how historically path-dependent and
contingent they are.
Admittedly, accusations of excessive conservatism or optimism
confront any defender of the status quo, so this may not be a terribly
worrisome objection-especially for those interpretive theorists who
aim to accommodate as many entrenched features of law as possible. 189
The more limited goal of this has been to open up new argumentative
avenues by rethinking remedies in terms of commodification and its
187. See Shiffrin, supranote 178.
188. This is a standard worry about overzealous use of specific performance. See, e.g., 12
CORBIN, supra note 108, § 65.25 (remarking that specific performance risks "involuntary personal
servitude").
189. See, e.g., Kar, supra note 65, at 799-804 (advocating an interpretive theory of law that
aims to preserve and account for the doctrine of consideration rather than seek its reform).
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moral limits. At a minimum, my hope is that the proffered
recharacterization of the remedies debates undermines idle dismissals
of promise theory's excessive moralism. Moralism is no more a problem
for contract theory than it is for commodification debates generally.
Recognizing this counts as progress.
D. Debates About Boilerplateand the Contract-as-ProductModel
The preceding discussion ignores boilerplate contracts, which
are ubiquitous and make possible a dizzying variety of market
exchanges. They represent an extreme form of commodification of the
practice of promising, so much so that they expose an inherent tension
between the market function of contract law and its promissory
foundation. This tension has been long recognized in one form or
another, so the observation I make here in some ways will not be novel.
My main goal in this Section is to show how, despite presupposing a
pro-market, instrumental justification for contract law, and despite
accepting that there is a reason to enforce boilerplate terms, CCP also
preserves room for boilerplate skeptics who raise moral concerns about
boilerplate practices.
A useful place to start is by laying out a challenge to boilerplate
contracts and presenting a conception of boilerplate, so-called contractas-product theory, that tries to answer that challenge.19 0 The challenge
comes from the fact that voluntary choice is not only a requirement for
contract formation but also plays a vital role in justifying holding
contracting parties legally accountable for their contractual
commitments. 191 The difficulty is that "accepting" boilerplate terms
often looks like only a very weak approximation of voluntary choice, at
best.1 92 Often it is simply implausible to assert that we have committed
to the terms deeply embedded in the fine print, terms that we not only
know nothing about but which it would be irrational to try to
understand. 193 So justifying boilerplate practices appears to require
190. Rather than purporting to accurately represent the historical development of the
boilerplate-as-product theory in the academy, this reconstruction serves as an expository device.
191. See, e.g., FRIED, supra note 130; RADIN, supra note 1, at 15 ("[O]ur system is committed
to the moral premise that justifies our legal structure of contract enforcement, that premise being
that people who enter contracts are voluntarily giving up something in exchange for something
they value more."); Barnett, supra note 21.
192. See RADIN, supra note 1, at 82-98 (arguing that autonomy theories, including consent
theories and others grounded in voluntary undertakings, lack the resources to explain why we
should treat boilerplate terms as binding on consumers).
193. See, e.g., Lucian A. Bebchuk & Richard A. Posner, One-Sided Contracts in Competitive
Consumer Markets, in BOILERPLATE: THE FOUNDATION OF MARKET CONTRACTS 3, 8 (Omri Ben-

Shahar ed., 2007) ("The novelty of the present analysis is that the same contract forms that are
widely assumed to be based on consumer ignorance can be shown to be consistent with competition
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something beyond consenting to commitments. There are other
critiques of boilerplate, 194 but this one focuses on the problem of
ignorance about one's voluntarily assumed commitments and assumes
that at a certain point ignorance surrounding those commitmentsincluding their content-is incompatible with their being binding or
valid. 195 Boilerplate contracts' routine enforcement by courts has
undermined the central role of consent in contract formation and the
justification of contract law as a whole. Margaret Jane Radin calls this
the problem of "normative degradation." 19 6
Contract-as-product represents one of the main responses to this
challenge. Product theorists argue that we should think of boilerplate
as part of the circuitry or other intrinsic properties of the product or
services we purchase. 197 We do not know much about the technology
that makes our laptops work or the code that makes our software run,
for example, yet we somehow manage to purchase them successfully at
a certain price that fits our willingness and ability to pay. 19 8 Boilerplate
terms just represent further "circuitry" or "software" that make the
purchase possible at the desired price. Imposing more functionality on
the laptop than the manufacturer is willing to insert on its own may be
possible. But that comes at a steep price, literally; gone is our desired
price, since often the manufacturer will pass on to consumers the costs
of the extra functionality. Similarly, treating boilerplate differently
under conditions of full information."). It is uncontroversial that people do not read boilerplate.
See, e.g., Tess Wilkinson-Ryan, A Psychological Account of Consent to Fine Print, 99 IOwA L. REV.
1745, 1753 (2014) ("it is now a given that we live in a world in which boilerplate terms are
ubiquitous yet unknown, ever present and never read.").

194. See, e.g., RADIN, supra note 1, at 33-51 (arguing that boilerplate leads to democratic
degradation because important rights granted by a democratic polity become appropriated by
drafters of boilerplate and replaced with a "law" favorable to firms).
195. Omri Ben-Shahar has argued that ignorance is not the problem because, even in the
absence of boilerplate, most of us would be ignorant about the law's default rules and cases that
govern our agreements absent express choice. See Omri Ben-Shahar, Regulation Through
Boilerplate:An Apologia, 112 MICH. L. REV. 883, 892 (2014) (reviewing RADIN, supra note 1 and
calling the problem of ignorance a "distraction"). There is something to this argument, but it seems
too quick as presented, as it ignores the possibility that ignorance about our own special obligations
and interpersonal commitments that are voluntarily undertaken may pose a special problem, one
that calls into question the validity or existence of those obligations or commitments, morally
speaking.
196. RADIN, supra note 1, at 15. Interestingly, Oman acknowledges consent is "less central" to
boilerplate and contractual liability. See OMAN, supra note 4, at 156. But there is a tension with
this stance and the essential role that consent still plays in contract doctrine and theories
justifying this aspect of the doctrine, as well as with his acknowledgment that contract law should
avoid facilitating undesirable market practices. See id. at 160-81.
197. See, e.g., Douglas G. Baird, The BoilerplatePuzzle, 104 MICH. L. REV. 933 (2006) (raising
"the boilerplate puzzle" about why our ignorance of boilerplate terms should raise any special
concern as compared to that raised by our ignorance of certain intrinsic features of a product);
Arthur Allen Leff, Contractas Thing, 19 AM. U. L. REV. 131 (1970).
198. See Baird, supra note 197, at 933.
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than any other term involves redesigning the software of the contract
in a costly way that consumers probably do not want, if it means higher
prices.

199

Construing boilerplate terms as part of the product itself tries to
immunize boilerplate against critiques that draw from promise and
consent theories. 200 Ignorance is no longer a problem: we are ignorant
of the code that makes our software work. Nor is voluntary assent to
specific terms: the only relevant assent is to the product-plus-terms in
exchange for a given price. How that package is made possible is neither
here nor there from the consumer's perspective, absent deception,
fraud, or coercion. Boilerplate terms are just absorbed into the product
itself.
So what does the framework of CCP have to say about all this?
Presumably CCP endorses the enforcement of boilerplate terms. 201 Not
only does boilerplate ostensibly involve exchanging promises for a price,
but contract-as-product construes these promises as if they have the
same metaphysical status as commodities in the narrowest and perhaps
most familiar sense-as if these promises were tangible goods that are
fungible and produced precisely for the purpose of market exchange.
Therefore, insofar as boilerplate commodifies promises, CCP prima
facie recommends enforcing them just like any other commodified
promise.
But this is far from the end of the story. CCP also provides a
framework for, and is consistent with, a more skeptical stance towards

&

199. For a related discussion of the "price effect," see Ben-Shahar, supra note 195, at 895-96.
200. This does not, of course, entail that boilerplate practices are immune from criticism, full
stop. Indeed, rather than resisting the boilerplate-as-product analogy, some prominent boilerplate
critics have embraced it, arguing that ex ante regulation and public standardization of some
consumer products-e.g., consumer safety standards applicable to toasters and toys-should
likewise apply to "financial products" and other mass market contracts. See Oren Bar-Gill
Elizabeth Warren, Making Credit Safer, 157 U. PA. L. REV. 1, 4 n.1 (2008) (identifying "financial
consumer products as a subcategory of consumer products" and "mirror[ing] the well-known
argument about the collapse of the contract-product distinction," and calling for greater regulation
of consumer financial products partially on those grounds); see also Elizabeth Warren, Unsafe at
Any Rate, DEMOCRACY, Summer 2007, http://democracyjournal.org/magazine/5/unsafe-at-anyrate/ [https://perma.cc/ST5F-JNFH] (comparing regulations applicable to home-destroying
toasters to those that apply to home-destroying mortgages). If boilerplate terms are products like
toasters and toys, this eliminates the pretense that ordinary interpersonal commitments-and
their attendant norms-provide special reasons to resist ex ante public regulation. To see why,
notice that if we model boilerplate on arm's length commitments between consenting adults,
external intervention by the state initially smacks of worrisome restriction on our freedom to
contract, or of paternalism. But if we model boilerplate as consumer products, regulating these
products to promote "public safety" seems far less controversial-at least no less controversial than
making sure our toys and toasters are not chock-full of lead or likely to explode.
201. To this extent, CCP's verdict accords with that of OMAN, supra note 4, at 158-59
(asserting that a market-based foundation for contract law should generally enforce boilerplate
terms).
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enforcing boilerplate terms, especially as interpreted by contract-asproduct theory. That theory asks us to treat promissory rights and
commitments, which govern exchanges between firms and persons, as
absorbed by products being exchanged. Treating commitments this
way, either theoretically or in practice, suppresses the promissory
commitment that contractual terms are supposed to represent. The
more we conceive of contract terms as stitched into the fabric of goods
we purchase, the less obvious it seems that the norms that govern
promises-or commitments more generally-govern those terms.
Consider one norm undermined by boilerplate and the contractas-product theory that supports it. For a promisor to make a promise or
commitment, she must at least be in a position to know that she is
entering into a binding commitment. This is a quite weak constraint on
a theory of promising or committing. 202 Call this the notice requirement.
That is, if one is not even in a position to know that one is making a
binding promise (whether or not one has knowledge of that
commitment), it is doubtful that one can make a promise, let alone a
binding one.
The notice requirement plays an important, if often overlooked,
role in allowing us to avoid commitments, ensuring freedom from
commitments. But if boilerplate commitments are just like product
attributes that consumers are not in a position to know about, then
boilerplate "commitments" do not satisfy the notice requirement. At its
logical extreme, the contract-as-product analogy implies that someone
handing you a t-shirt on the street may very well succeed in binding
you to certain terms-i.e., a requirement to disclose your email address.
You would not know the thread count of the shirt, after all, so why
would entering into a wholly unknown commitment be any different?
So contract-as-product theory appears consistent with erasing the
notice requirement, an important constraint on the formation of a valid
commitment.
The t-shirt example is extreme but not that far from reality.
Consider "ripwrap" or "rolling" boilerplate. In ripwrap contracts, which
purport to bind consumers to terms upon tearing open packaging
containing new products, consumers are not in a position to know those
terms until they commit to them, and they are often not even in a
202. Indeed, many accounts of promising hold stronger views, requiring that promisors and
promisees share actual knowledge of the content of the proposed commitment. See, e.g., T.M.
SCANLON, WHAT WE OWE TO EACH OTHER 295-97 (1998) (arguing, roughly, that promissory
commitments depend on a promisee's having been assured that the promisor will undertake some
future action); Erik Encarnacion, Reviving the Assurance Conception of Promising, 48 J. VALUE
INQUIRY 107, 123 (2014) (defending a principle of promissory morality according to which forming
a binding promissory commitment depends on a would-be promisee's knowing something about a
promisor's intentions).
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position to know that ripping open packaging constitutes a form of
acceptance to a set of commitments. 203 Consumers that sign rolling
contracts commit to terms before they even see them, receiving them
later by mail.204 Although some alleged "notice" is offered, it is often so
weak so as to stretch the concept to its breaking point. 205 And the lack
of notice is beside the point: notice is not supposed to substitute for
or otherwise. 206 The notice
promissory
actual commitment,
requirement, as I have articulated it, serves only as a normative
constrainton the validity of that commitment. So if it is true that there
is something like a notice requirement implicit in all morally valid
commitments, it is doubtful whether some forms of boilerplate satisfy
that requirement. The logical terminus of contract-as-product theory,
when put into practice, degrades a crucial moral and conventional norm
governing promissory commitments and commitments more generally.
What does this mean with respect to CCP? To the extent that
these boilerplate practices (ripwrap, at least) and justifications
(contract-as-product theory) erode this notice norm, this serves as an
intrinsic reason against commodifying promises in this way, in the
sense of "intrinsic" I have already discussed. This, in turn, means that
CCP would recognize a reason against enforcing this kind of boilerplate
agreement.
I have focused on contract-as-product theory and two types of
boilerplate contracts that represent extreme manifestations of that
theory. But there are other intrinsic (and extrinsic) reasons against
more
promises that apply to boilerplate
over-commodifying
generally. 207 For present purposes it nevertheless remains important to
notice how, although CCP does provide a reason to enforce boilerplate
(given they involve commodified promises), CCP also allows for
countervailing reasons against enforcing certain forms of boilerplate
commitments. This means, perhaps surprisingly, that endorsing
market-based instrumentalist justifications for contract law does not
require enthusiastically rubber stamping boilerplate commitments or

203. See KiM, supra note 11, at 3.
204. RADIN, supra note 1, at 11.
205. See id. at 93 ("A fortiori, it would at least take a lot of mental gymnastics to argue
convincingly that constructive notice is really tantamount to consent.").
206. See id. ("But 'having an opportunity' [to read boilerplate terms] does not come near to
consent to the divestment.").
207. See, e.g., RADIN, supra note 1. Another avenue for inquiry would examine how boilerplate
transforms the rationality of investigating one's commitments. Plausibly, it is not irrational to
investigate the nature and scope of one's commitments, but boilerplate manages to make this
investigation wholly irrational, since we cannot change boilerplate terms even if we do not like
them, and because the important legal rights that are often deleted-such as the right to a jury
trial-would be invoked only in the unlikely event that something goes wrong.
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even having a particularly sanguine view about them. Equally
important is that the zenith of promissory commodification-i.e.,
contract-as-product theory-also counts as its nadir as a form of
interpersonal commitment.
CONCLUSION
Contracts commodify promises. My overall view marries an
instrumental, market-based justification for contract law and a
promise-based one. The instrumental justification for contract law
holds that contract law aims to facilitate markets by enforcing
promises. This answers one of the main stock objections to promise
theories: why enforce promises? The answer is: because doing so
facilitates market economies. The instrumental justification also points
towards an answer to the second stock objection: which promises should
be enforced? The answer: primarily commercial promises.
Much of this Article has taken great pains to explicate the idea
of a commercial promise in terms of a commodified promise, thereby
enabling me to articulate the core doctrines of Contract as Commodified
Promise. The doctrines were threefold. First, the fact that a promise has
been commodified provides a reason favoring its enforcement in
contract law; second, the fact that a promise has not been commodified,
or (third) has been improperly commodified, provide reasons against
enforceability. Although I present CCP as a view that holds
independently of any particular jurisdiction's contract law, some of the
view's plausibility does depend on the justification it provides for some
deeply entrenched and useful doctrines of contract law, such as the
rules barring enforcement of illegal contracts. The argument is thus, in
part, interpretive: part of the support for the doctrine comes from its
ability to make sense of aspects of legal doctrine that I take to be
justifiable.
But if there is one overall takeaway, it is this: recognizing that
contracts involve commodifying not just underlying goods or services,
but also promises themselves, helps tie together promise-based theories
of contract law with commerce-oriented ones, while also opening up new
terms of debate between them. Contract as Commodified Promise does
this in a way that neither denigrates the import of commercial concerns
for contract law nor chides promise theories of contract law for excessive
moralism. And surprisingly-as the discussion of contract-formation
doctrines and the enduring debates about remedies show-Contract as
Commodified Promise provides argumentative resources in favor of
doctrinal reform. Robust normative theories should supply these
resources.
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That said, although commodifying promises is a welcome and
necessary means of forming and sustaining modern market societies,
there remains a tension at the nexus of promising and commodifying.
We saw this tension at work in our brief evaluation of boilerplate. Using
the lens provided by Contract as Commodified Promise, we identified
ways in which boilerplate and its justifications risk encouraging overcommodifying promises by disregarding important notice requirements
that apply to all commitments, promissory or otherwise. In any event,
whether understood as a unifying thesis, interpretive lens, normative
source of guidance, or way of rethinking moral critiques of contract law,
Contract as Commodified Promise counts as a framework worthy of
further consideration.

